

International Migration: Facing the Challenge

By Philip Martin and Jonas Widgren

Migration is likely to increase in the 21st century.

Most migration occurs between less developed countries.

International migrants are less than 3 percent of world population.

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International Migration: Facing the Challenge

by *Philip Martin and Jonas Widgren*

“Man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported.” — Adam Smith

International migration—people moving across national borders—is a global challenge for the 21st century. More than 190 nation-states issue their own passports and visas and regulate who can cross their borders and stay. At least 160 million people were living outside their country of birth or citizenship in 2000, up from an estimated 120 million in 1990.¹ If the world’s migrants were in one place, they would create the world’s sixth most populous country (after China, India, the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil).

Most of the world’s 6.1 billion people never cross a national border—they will live and die near their place of birth. Most people who do cross national borders will move only a short distance to nearby countries. But more than 80 percent of the world’s population live in less developed countries, and most international migrants move from one less developed nation to another. Still, at least 40 percent of the world’s international migrants live in a handful of industrialized countries, including the United States, and their presence raises major socioeconomic issues in the countries of origin and countries of destination.² This *Population Bulletin* explains why people cross national borders, why such migration is often controversial, and how migra-

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South Asian immigrant communities are an increasing presence in London. International migration presents many countries with social, economic, and political challenges.


tion can be managed more effectively in the 21st century. International migration is examined within the major world regions—North and South America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania.

Thinking About Migration

Migration is as old as humans wandering in search of food, but international migration is a relatively recent phenomenon: It was only in the early

Figure 1

World Population: Migrants and Nonmigrants, 1965, 1985, 2000



Sources: United Nations, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock Revision 4* (1999); and unpublished estimates from the United Nations Population Division.

20th century that the system of nation-states, passports, and visas developed to regulate the flow of people across national borders. The volume of the flow fluctuates, depending on world events. In 1965, an estimated 75 million people were living outside their country of birth, but this was less than 3 percent of world population. The migrant proportion of world population has increased only slightly since then (see Figure 1).

Migration is the exception, not the rule, for two major reasons. The first and most powerful is inertia: Most people lack the desire and drive to leave home and move away from family and friends. The second reason is that the movement of people across a country's borders is controlled by national governments. Governments have significant capacity to regulate migration through passports, visas, and border controls.

Nevertheless, the management of international migration is likely to

become more controversial, difficult, and urgent in the 21st century. There were about 190 recognized nation-states in 2000, up from just 43 in 1900.³ Each nation-state has a system of passports to distinguish citizens from foreigners, border controls to inspect persons who want to enter, and policies that affect the settlement and integration of noncitizens. Most countries do not anticipate the arrival of foreigners who wish to settle and become naturalized citizens, and they discourage immigration through laws and border controls. Some nations also discourage emigration. The efforts of the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations to prevent emigration were symbolized by the Berlin Wall until 1989. North Korea continues to prohibit emigration of its citizens.

There are just five major countries that officially welcome international migrants as permanent residents: the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel, and New Zealand. Collectively these countries accept 1.2 million immigrants a year. About 800,000 immigrants each year are officially admitted to the United States; 200,000 to Canada; 75,000 to Australia; 65,000 to Israel; and 35,000 to New Zealand.⁴ But these figures account for a small percentage of the estimated annual global immigration, which means that most people who take up residence in another country each year are not accepted as official immigrants. Instead, many migrants are refugees seeking protection; guest workers who are expected to depart after several years of work; and unauthorized or illegal foreigners who enter and settle in defiance of immigration laws.

Migration may be viewed as a natural and predictable response to differences in the countries of origin and destination—differences in resources and jobs, in demographic growth, and in security and human rights. In the past, significant economic, demographic, and sociopolitical differences between areas have prompted large-scale migration. In

1800, Europe had 20 percent of the world's nearly 1 billion residents, while the Americas had 3 percent.⁵ During the 19th century, millions of Europeans emigrated to North and South America in search of economic opportunity and religious and political freedom. Two centuries later, Europe has just 12 percent of the world's 6 billion people while North and South America together have about 14 percent.

Another shift of population may occur in the next century as population growth and a lack of economic opportunities in one region foster large-scale migration to another, more prosperous, region. In the 21st century, Africa is likely to be a major source of migrants, as young people move from overcrowded cities in Africa to industrial societies with slow-growing or declining populations and a high proportion of older residents. Large numbers of migrants from Africa already are beginning to arrive in Europe in search of jobs.

How will the industrial democracies with growing proportions of elderly residents react to the large-scale immigration of young people from less developed countries? The industrialized countries have already stepped up their expenditures on border controls, and have taken other steps that, critics argue, make the 25 richest nations appear to be islands of wealth defended by ever-higher walls to keep out migrants escaping a sea of poverty. The U.S. government, for example, increased the budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from \$1 billion in 1990 to \$4 billion in 2000, a decade in which most federal agencies did not receive significant additional funds. Further increases are expected following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks by foreign terrorists, as many Americans view foreigners as a potential source of violence as well as an economic threat (see Box 1, page 6). Spending on immigration controls in Western European countries similarly tripled and quadrupled in the 1990s.

Critics of stepped-up immigration controls argue that industrialized countries need young migrants for economic and demographic reasons: Migrants keep social security systems viable and slow population aging. This view was championed by the late economist Julian Simon, who argued that people were "the ultimate resource" in his book of the same name, and that immigration was economically desirable because more people meant more creativity and growth.

But some analysts believe that, regardless of whether migration has a positive or negative effect, the industrialized countries will not be able to stop the arrival of desperate migrants, and that only military force can prevent shiploads or armies of poor migrants attempting to sail or march into rich countries, threatening their security.⁶ Some leaders of less developed countries have emphasized the need for more foreign aid from wealthy countries to slow emigration. The late President Houari Boumediene of Algeria and leader of the Group of 77 less developed nations warned that if the rich countries did not provide more foreign aid: "No quantity of atomic bombs could stem the tide of billions ... who will some day leave the poor southern part of the world to erupt into the relatively accessible spaces of the rich northern hemisphere looking for survival."⁷

But most experts maintain that migration is a manageable challenge. They emphasize that most people do not want to cross national borders, and that the world's migrants are less than 3 percent of the world's population, despite leaky borders. Mexico-U.S. migration provides an example of the desire of most people to stay home. There are about 109 million persons alive today who were born in Mexico and less than 9 million of them are in the United States legally or illegally.⁸ Despite a century of Mexico-U.S. migration over the 2,000-mile border, at least 90 percent of persons born in Mexico live in Mexico.

Migrants are less than 3 percent of the world's population, despite leaky borders.

Why People Migrate

International migration is usually a major individual or family decision that is carefully considered—crossing national borders to settle or work in another country is not an easy decision. There are two broad categories of migrants: those who decided to

migrate to another country for primarily economic reasons, and those who moved primarily for noneconomic reasons (see Table 1, page 8). The factors that encourage a migrant to actually move are grouped into three categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors. Economic migrants may, for example, be encouraged to migrate by demand-

Box 1

Can Immigration Policies Thwart Terrorism?

On Sept. 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four planes over U.S. airspace and, using the planes as bombs, caused the deaths of more than 3,000 people. The hijackers apparently were foreigners who had been in the United States from a week to several years. At least 16 had entered with legal student or tourist visas.

In the wake of the attacks, the United States and many other countries are examining their immigration policies and considering ways to thwart potential terrorists. Immigration policy reforms cannot prevent terrorism, but they are a key part of any effort to combat terrorism. Immigration policies aim to facilitate the entry of wanted foreigners, and to identify and deter the entry of terrorists and other unwanted foreigners.

Policy Reform Challenges

The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks highlighted four reasons that current U.S. immigration policy does little to thwart international terrorists. First, the procedures for obtaining visas and identification documents do not deter potential criminals from entering the country. All the hijackers were able to obtain seemingly valid visas with supporting documents.

Second, illegal entry into the country is relatively easy, even without visas, because of the long and lightly guarded national border. In December 1999, Algerian Ahmed Ressay was caught attempting to enter the United States from Canada with bomb-making materials that he planned to use to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium celebrations.

Third, the U.S. government does not track the movements of foreigners inside the country. For example, one of the Sept. 11 hijackers was admitted to the United States to study English, but he never showed up at the school that admitted him. There is no system to alert law enforcement of visa violations that might uncover a potential terrorist plot. Several of the hijackers were in the country with expired visas.

Fourth, there has been (until recently) little cooperation or information-sharing among countries about terrorist suspects.

There are three major areas in which changes in immigration policies may be able to counter future terrorist threats: visa issuance and entry inspections, border controls, and interior enforcement. The United States may also have to pay special attention to foreign students and consider harmonizing immigration and asylum policies with Canada to preserve a fairly open Canada-U.S. border.

Entries to the United States are screened through the National Automated Immigration Lookout System, or NAILS, which contains the names of foreigners believed to pose a security risk to the United States. But false names supported by fraudulent documentation can fool NAILS. An improved lookout database must be capable of matching not only names, which can be easily changed, but also biometrics such as fingerprints and facial characteristics. NAILS could be enlarged with information from the FBI.

Another way to tighten the borders is to track the entries and exits of all for-

pull guest worker recruitment; noneconomic migrants might be motivated to cross borders to join family members settled abroad.

A man living in rural Mexico, for example, may be offered a job in the United States by a recruiter, or hear about U.S. job openings on the radio—a demand-pull factor.⁹ This potential migrant may not have a job

at home, or he may face crop failures, which make him willing to move—a supply-push factor. After obtaining information about U.S. work and wages from a returned migrant—a network factor—he decides to migrate from Mexico to the United States.

The three factors encouraging an individual to migrate do not have equal weights, and the weight of each

eign visitors. The current system to record entries and exits—via the I-94 form—is not effective for tracking potential criminals. Entry-exit tracking was opposed by Canada and northern U.S. states because its cost and inconvenience would hurt commuting, trade, and tourism.

Technology could ease some of these drawbacks and make it easier to track foreigners in the country. Australia, for example, uses an electronic visa that is incorporated into the airline ticket, which could be a model for a similar U.S. program. The United States already is experimenting with commuter lanes on the Mexico-U.S. border that permit officials to screen regular travelers and issue them special documentation and devices for their cars to speed crossings without sacrificing security.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) stepped up border enforcement in the 1990s by adding agents, fences, and lights along the borders in urban areas in Arizona, California, and Texas. Expanding this strategy to more of the 2,000 mile Mexican-U.S. border would help to deter unauthorized migrants, including potential terrorists. But expanding border controls would cost more money and would take time to implement.

Surveillance of foreigners already in the United States is a controversial issue because many view it as an unacceptable police presence. After the Sept. 11 attacks, many U.S. universities dropped their long-standing opposition to the tracking of foreign students, but many Americans oppose the idea of a national identification system that would require

all U.S. residents to carry a counterfeit-resistant ID. The current system makes it easy for unauthorized foreigners to get “legal” identification. Three of the Sept. 11 hijackers apparently got Virginia driver’s licenses using fraudulent documents.

International Cooperation

The United States and Canada could harmonize their immigration and asylum policies to erect a “security perimeter” around the two countries, following the European Union (EU) model. The Schengen Agreement permits freer movement within the EU because entry and exit controls are done at the external border of the 13 participating countries. Such a system could be feasible with Canada, and perhaps eventually with Mexico.

International cooperation can help prevent terrorism from slowing economic globalization. Cooperation and data sharing can help to identify suspected terrorists and prevent them from moving from one country to another to carry out attacks. Cooperation will also be needed to combat smuggling and trafficking operations that could be used by terrorist organizations to move persons clandestinely.

Terrorists pose a formidable challenge common to all countries. But tackling terrorism is likely to result in closer cooperation among the industrialized countries, and gradually to a convergence in their immigration and asylum policies.

Adapted from Philip Martin and Susan Martin, “Immigration and Terrorism: Policy Reform Challenges.” Paper prepared for a conference on immigration sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the King Baudouin Foundation, Brussels, Oct. 14-15, 2001.

Table 1

Determinants of Migration

Type of Migrant	Factors Encouraging an Individual to Migrate		
	Demand-Pull	Supply-Push	Network/Other
Economic	Labor recruitment, better wages	Un- or underemployment; low wages	Job and wage information flows
Noneconomic	Family unification	War and persecution	Communications; transportation; assistance organizations; desire for new experience

Note: These examples are illustrative. Individuals contemplating migration may be encouraged to move by all three factors. The importance of pull, push, and network factors can change over time.

factor can change over time. Generally, demand-pull and supply-push factors are strongest at the beginnings of a migration flow, and network factors become more important as the migration stream matures. A common sequence begins with the recruitment of guest workers, often in rural areas where jobs are scarce. After these migrants return with information about job opportunities abroad, network factors may become more important in sustaining migration, so that even employed workers in Mexico may migrate to the United States for higher wages.

One of the most important noneconomic motivations for crossing national borders is family unification—a father working abroad wants to have his wife and children join him, for example. In such cases, the anchor immigrant is a demand-pull factor for family chain migration. The migrant’s immediate family may be followed by brothers and sisters, and then by their families.

Some migrants are impelled to cross national borders by war and political persecution at home. Some of these migrants qualify as refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which defines a refugee as a person residing outside his or her country of citizenship who is unwilling or unable to return because of “a

well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Countries that signed the Geneva Convention pledged not to “refoul” or return persons to places where they could be persecuted. The United States and many other countries distinguish between refugees, who request entry into the United States for protection, and asylum seekers, who arrive in the United States, usually illegally, and then ask to stay because they face persecution at home.


Globalization has made more people aware of conditions and opportunities abroad. Tourism has become a major industry, as people cross national borders to experience new cultures or the wonders of nature. Many young people go abroad to study or work or simply for personal enrichment.

Some current migration streams reflect the traditional flows between former colonies and their colonizers. Long after these colonies gained independence, migration streams continue between India and Pakistan and the United Kingdom, for example, and between the Philippines and the United States.

Immigration policies aim to facilitate wanted migration, such as tourism, and to deter unwanted

Figure 2

Major Migration Patterns in the Early 21st Century



migration, such as migrants who arrive on tourist visas and do not depart as scheduled. But it is often hard for inspectors at ports of entry to distinguish a legitimate tourist from an unauthorized worker or settler. Most countries require visas from foreigners wishing to enter and maintain consulates abroad to screen visitors to determine if they truly intend to return home. About one-quarter of the nearly 10 million applications for visas to enter the United States each year are denied.¹⁰

Regional Trends

Most people who cross national borders do not go far, so most international migrants stay within the same geographic region. But there are also major migration flows among regions, as shown in Figure 2. The volume and direction of these migration streams shift over time according to political and economic factors in the sending and receiving areas.

North and South America

The North American migration system includes the world's major emigration and immigration destinations, whether defined in per capita terms or by numbers, such as the 300,000 to 400,000 Mexicans who move each year to the United States.¹¹ Canada and the United States include about 5 percent of the world's population, but they receive more than one-half of the world's immigrants.


Emigration rates are very high from many Caribbean nations. Jamaica, with 2.6 million residents in 2001, sent about 25,000 emigrants a year abroad in the mid-1990s, or nearly 1 percent of its population.¹²

Canada

Canada has a relatively high rate of immigration, generous social welfare programs, and general public satisfaction with its immigration policies. Many analysts attribute public support for immigration among Canadians to an admissions system dominated by entrants who are screened to ensure

Figure 3

Immigration to the United States and Canada, 1860-2000



Sources: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Annual Statistical Yearbooks*; and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (www.cic.gc.ca, accessed Jan. 9, 2002).

that they will be an economic asset to Canada; minimal illegal immigration, in part because Canada does not border a major emigration country; and flexible immigration policies.

Canada has three major avenues of entry for legal immigrants:

- Economic (skilled workers and business investors: 55 percent of the 190,000 immigrants in 1999);
- Family unification (29 percent of 1999 immigrants); and
- Refugee (13 percent of 1999 immigrants).¹³

China, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines are the source of most Canadian immigrants. These four countries accounted for about 30 percent of immigrants to Canada in 1999.

Canadian immigration numbers and policies have mirrored those of the United States. For example, the United States barred Chinese immigrants in 1882, and Canada took steps to limit Chinese immigration in 1885. Immigration to Canada peaked between 1895 and 1913—some 2.5 million immigrants arrived in a country that had a 1913 population of 7 million (see Figure 3). In the after-

math of World War II, Canada permitted refugees and displaced persons from Europe to enter, including 40,000 Hungarians in 1956 and 1957. Canada's "white only" immigration policy, which favored newcomers from Europe and the United States—ended in 1962.

Canada's Immigration Act of 1976 established a point system to select immigrants who were not entering to join family members. This system assesses foreigners who wish to immigrate for economic reasons against nine criteria. Applicants can score a maximum 107 points and must score at least 75 points to get an immigrant visa. Language skills (knowing English or French), for example, can earn an applicant a maximum 15 points, while education beyond a bachelor's degree can earn a potential immigrant up to 16 points. An additional educational training factor (ETF) that reflects the level of education and training required for an applicant's occupation is worth up to 18 points.

In the 1990s, many Canadians became concerned that too many immigrants were arriving, too many

were becoming dependent on welfare assistance, and that too many came seeking asylum even though they did not really face persecution at home. In 1998, an independent commission issued a report that urged a series of changes, including a new requirement that immigrants admitted under the point system must speak English or French before their arrival, and that immigrants arriving to join settled family members must speak English or French or pay fees to learn English or French after arrival. Some of these recommendations are included in Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001.

The flexibility of the Canadian immigration system and the ambivalence of the Canadian public about immigration were illustrated in 1997, when Canada imposed visa requirements on Czech citizens in anticipation of what was described as a "flood" of Czech Roma, or gypsies, seeking asylum. In August 1997, a film aired on Czech television that implied that Czech Roma who reached Canada were almost guaranteed refugee status and welfare benefits. More than 1,500 entered Canada by the end of 1997, and half applied for asylum. Even before the first of these gypsies was granted refugee status, the new Canadian visa policy made it hard for more Czechs to enter the country.¹⁴

Canada has officially been a multicultural society since 1971, a stance that was reinforced by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988. Canada subsidizes activities that "facilitate the full and active participation of ethnic, racial, religious and cultural communities in Canadian society," which is why Canada is sometimes called a "community of communities."¹⁵ Canadians contrast their cultural mosaic metaphor with the United States' melting-pot image, in which cultural groups lose their identities as they become "American." Canada has a Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the Status of Women in its Canadian Heritage ministry, which emphasizes their multicultural identity.

Canada admits nonimmigrants, persons expected to leave after a period of work, tourism, or business in Canada. There is one special type of nonimmigrant worker. Under the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to reduce trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 64 categories of professionals, including accountants, engineers, and lawyers, may cross the Canadian-U.S. border to work in the other country by showing an offer of employment, a professional credential, and a passport at the border. NAFTA professionals may bring their families with them. There will be open borders for professionals from Canada, Mexico, and the United States after 2003.

Canada also admits about 17,000 temporary farm workers each year. Most are from Jamaica and Mexico, and most work on fruit, vegetable, and tobacco farms. Canadian farmers wanting to hire Mexican guest workers must pay the workers' transportation to Canada and housing, and give them at least the minimum wage. To discourage guest workers from settling permanently, the selection criteria favor people who are most likely to return to Mexico. For example, only Mexican men ages 22 to 45 who are married and have children may apply. Successful applicants must have at least a third-grade education, but not more than an elementary school education, to be guest workers on Canadian farms.

United States

The United States is a nation of immigrants. U.S. presidents frequently remind Americans that they share the experience of themselves or their forebears leaving another country to begin anew in the United States.¹⁶ Immigration is viewed as serving the U.S. national interest: It permits immigrants to better themselves as it strengthens the United States.

Immigration brings costs as well as benefits. These costs were the focus of policy attention in the mid-1990s, leading to the approval of Proposition

There will be open borders for professionals from Canada, Mexico, and the United States after 2003.

Table 2

Foreigners Entering the United States, by Category, 2000

Category	Number
Immigrants	849,807
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens	347,870
Other family-sponsored	235,280
Employment-based	107,024
Refugees and asylees	65,941
Diversity immigrants	50,945
Other immigrants	42,747
Estimated emigration	220,000
Nonimmigrants entering U.S.	33,651,072
Visitors for pleasure/business	30,511,125
Temporary workers/trainees	634,788
Foreign students and dependents	676,283
Illegal immigration	
Alien apprehensions	1,814,729
Aliens deported	184,775
Alien smugglers located	14,406
Unauthorized foreigners (estim.)	8,500,000
Annual increase (1995-2000)	700,000

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Legal Immigration: Fiscal Year 2000* (2002); and J. Passel, "Estimates of Undocumented Immigrants" (Urban Institute, 2001).

187 in California in 1994 and major legislative changes in 1996.¹⁷ Proposition 187 was never implemented, however, and immigration faded from the headlines in the late 1990s, when the U.S. unemployment rate reached its lowest levels in three decades and a booming economy generated an average of 10,000 additional jobs each work day. Immigration to the United States was also booming during the 1990s—the foreign-born population rose by about 8 million over the decade to reach 28 million in 2000.

Immigration occurs in waves, and the United States is in the midst of its fourth wave of immigrants.¹⁸ The first wave arrived before 1820 and consisted primarily of English-speakers from the British Isles. The second wave, dominated by Irish and German immigrants in the 1840s and 1850s, challenged the dominance of Americans of Protestant and English heritage, and led to a backlash against Catholics and immigrants.

The third wave, between 1880 and 1914, brought more than 20 million immigrants to the United States, an average of 650,000 immigrants per

year (see Figure 3, page 10). Many of these southern and eastern European immigrants found jobs in factories in the cities of the Northeast and Midwest. Third-wave immigration was slowed first by World War I, and then by numerical quotas in the 1920s.

The fourth and current wave of immigration began with immigration reforms in 1965 that eliminated quotas that had favored European immigrants. Instead, immigrants got priority to enter the United States if they had family here, or if they had needed skills. The volume of immigrants rose sharply, and the major countries of origin shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia.

Three major types of foreigners arrive in the United States in this current wave: immigrants, nonimmigrants, and unauthorized foreigners (see Table 2). Under U.S. law, immigrants are persons entitled to live and work permanently in the United States and, after five years, to become naturalized U.S. citizens. There are four major categories of immigrants:

- Relatives of U.S. residents (69 percent of immigrants in 2000);
- Employment-based—immigrants admitted for economic or employment reasons and their families (13 percent);
- Refugees and asylees granted safe haven in the United States (8 percent); and
- Diversity immigrants—selected from a lottery open to people from countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the previous five years (6 percent).

Nonimmigrants are foreigners who come to the United States to visit, work, or study. There are no limits on most types of nonimmigrants; the United States is willing to accept far more than the 25 million foreign tourists who arrive in a typical year, and more than the 4 million to 5 million business visitors.

The admission of foreign workers is more controversial. The 635,000 foreign workers admitted in 2000 represented almost 30 percent of the net


growth of U.S. employment, which expands by about 2 million a year. About two-thirds of the foreign workers were professionals who received H-1B visas, which allow them to stay and work in the United States for up to six years. And, H-1B visa holders can switch to immigrant status if they find a U.S. employer to sponsor them by showing that qualified U.S. residents are not available to fill their jobs. About one-sixth of the foreign workers were unskilled workers who did jobs that varied from harvesting tobacco to cleaning hotels in resort areas. About 10 percent were outstanding athletes or entertainers.

The H-1B program illustrates the controversies that surround foreign worker programs. On the one side are employers who argue that the United States does not have enough U.S.-born computer programmers to remain globally competitive. These employers want few legal barriers between U.S. employers and foreign computer programmers. On the other side are those who argue that U.S. employers should do more to train and retrain U.S. workers to fill vacant jobs before recruiting abroad. Making it so easy to fill jobs with foreigners, they argue, will increase employer dependence on immigrant workers over time.

There is some truth in both assertions. During the dot-com boom of the 1990s, employment in the computer industry rose faster than U.S. computer specialists could be trained and retrained. Even when U.S. workers were available, however, some employers preferred to hire young foreigners who had just graduated from U.S. universities because they were more likely to work for lower salaries and longer hours than U.S. citizens, in the hope of being sponsored for an immigrant visa.¹⁹ A compromise was reached in 2000 with a law that raised the maximum number of H-1B admissions to 195,000 a year, but imposed new requirements to protect U.S. workers. Employers with 15 percent or more H-1B workers, for example, were prohibited from firing U.S. workers and hiring H-1Bs.

Figure 4

Estimates of Unauthorized Foreign Residents in the United States, 1980-2000



Source: J. Passel, "Estimates of Undocumented Immigrants" (Urban Institute, 2000).

Unauthorized foreigners, also known as undocumented workers and illegal aliens, are foreigners who enter the United States without inspection at ports of entry, or who enter legally, but then violate the terms of their entry by, for example, going to work after admission as a tourist, or not departing as scheduled. The number of unauthorized foreigners is not known, but the best estimates are that their number rose from 3 million in 1980 to 4 million in 1986, just before 2.7 million were legalized by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The number of unauthorized foreigners rose again during the 1990s and reached an estimated 8.5 million in 2000 (see Figure 4).

In 2001, the major immigration issue in the United States was what to do about these unauthorized foreigners. Mexican President Vicente Fox and U.S. President George W. Bush established a migration working group to devise "an orderly framework for migration that ensures humane treatment [and] legal security, and dignifies labor conditions." That group considered proposals to allow at least some unauthorized foreigners in the United States to attain legal status by becoming temporary guest workers, permanent immigrants, or a combination of both.

Caribbean nations have some of the world's highest emigration rates.

Under a concept called “earned legalization,” illegal foreigners employed in the United States would first get work permits that make them legal guest workers, and after several years of work they could earn legal immigrant status.

The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that, in 2000, 10 percent (28 million) of U.S. residents were born abroad, up sharply from 5 percent (10 million) foreign-born in 1970. Former Census Bureau director Kenneth Pre-witt noted that, if immigration continues, Americans will “redefine ourselves as the first country in world history which is literally made up of every part of the world.”²⁰

Latin America

Most Latin American countries are net emigration areas: They send more people abroad than they receive as immigrants. Mexico is the major emigration country in Latin America, and most Mexican migrants head to the United States. Mexico-U.S. migration began with the recruitment of rural Mexicans to work on U.S. farms during World War I and World War II to fill in for American men drafted into the military. During both of these *Bracero* (strong arm) programs, the recruitment continued after the war ended. Mexican workers and U.S. employers developed a mutual dependence that encouraged the migration to continue illegally after government-approved recruitment stopped.²¹ Almost half of the 8.5 million Mexicans in the United States in 2000 were believed to be unauthorized.²²

During the 1990s, Mexico took steps to reduce future emigration and to protect its citizens living in the United States. NAFTA went into effect in 1994, lowering trade and investment barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The three countries hoped that NAFTA would spur economic and job growth in Mexico, and thus reduce economically motivated migration. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Mexico’s president during the NAFTA negotiations,

urged the United States to approve NAFTA, saying: “We want to export goods, not people.”²³

Closer economic integration, however, often leads to a “migration hump,” a temporary increase in migration. Industries that were previously protected from competition often must cut their work force to compete with imports, creating more potential economic migrants. In Mexico, NAFTA made farmers, who were about 30 percent of Mexican workers, less competitive, which encouraged some to leave the land.²⁴ Mexican economic and job growth in the 1990s was very uneven, and thousands of Mexican women found jobs along the Mexico-U.S. border. Foreign-owned factories just south of the border, or *maquiladoras*, hired them to assemble televisions and cars that are exported to the United States. But many men looking for work entered the United States.

Mexico’s President Vicente Fox, elected in 2000, made protecting Mexicans in the United States a major priority. Fox called Mexicans in the U.S. “heroes” for the nearly US\$7 billion a year they send home to their families in Mexico. He asked the United States to provide “as many rights as possible, for as many Mexican immigrants as possible, as soon as possible ... [to] turn migration from a source of friction into shared responsibility that is mutually beneficial.”²⁵

Aside from Mexico, the seven other countries of Central America, with 38 million residents in 2001, were not major sources of immigrants to the United States before the 1980s. More than 90 percent of Central American immigrants admitted to the United States between 1820 and 1998 arrived after 1980.²⁶ El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua were wracked by civil wars in the 1980s, and many residents fled to neighboring countries as well as to the United States. Asylum was granted to Nicaraguans fleeing a government the United States opposed, but not to Salvadorans fleeing a government the United States supported. Neverthe-

less, lawsuits kept most Central American asylum-seekers in the United States during the 1990s, and new legislation allowed many to become legal immigrants.

After the fighting stopped, several natural disasters in the region caused U.S. officials to extend the practice of giving Central Americans temporary protected status (TPS) that allowed them to stay in the United States. In October and November 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused massive destruction in Honduras and Nicaragua. Honduran President Carlos Flores Facusse warned that a new wave of migrants will go “walking, swimming and running up north,” and asked the United States to grant TPS to Hondurans in the United States so they could send home remittances to help rebuild their countries—and the United States did so.²⁷ After earthquakes devastated El Salvador in 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush granted TPS to Salvadorans in the United States to “allow them to continue to work here and to remit some of their wages back home to support El Salvador’s recovery efforts.”²⁸

The 15 independent Caribbean nations, plus several dependencies, have some of the highest emigration rates in the world. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica have about 75 percent of the 36 million Caribbean residents, and each sends immigrants to the United States. There were 900,000 Cuban immigrants living in the United States in 2000, meaning that almost 10 percent of persons born in Cuba live in the United States. Most Cuban immigrants have settled in southern Florida, where they have been extraordinarily successful in business and politics, and have helped turn Miami into a gateway to Latin American business and finance.

Cubans migrated to the United States in three major waves: after Castro came to power in 1959, during the Mariel boat lift in 1980, and during the summer of 1994. The 1994 influx was stopped by an agreement that

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Guatemalan families build new lives in Mexico after fleeing persecution in their home country. Natural disasters, political violence, and economic stress prompted many Central Americans to migrate to Mexico or the United States in the last decade.

guarantees 20,000 immigrant visas a year to Cubans, but continues the U.S. “wet-foot, dry-foot policy” under which Cubans who reach U.S. soil are allowed to stay as immigrants, but those intercepted at sea are returned to Cuba.²⁹ Private boats regularly bring Cubans to Florida: Six-year-old Elian Gonzalez was aboard one of these boats when it sank on Thanksgiving Day, November 1999. He survived although his mother and other passengers drowned. Two fishermen brought Elian to Florida, and he was turned over to his Miami relatives—Cuban refugees who refused to release Elian because they did not want him returned to Cuba. After five months and amidst high publicity, the INS removed Elian from his relatives and he was allowed to return to Cuba with his father.

In 2000, about 700,000 Dominican immigrants lived in the United States. Most arrived after 1980, and most settled in New York City.³⁰ According to a 1997 poll conducted in the Dominican Republic, more than half of adult Dominicans would emigrate if they had the chance.³¹

Table 3

Foreigners and Foreign Workers in Western Europe, 1998

Country	Population		Foreigners' share of population (percent)	Labor force		Foreigners' share of labor force (percent)
	Total (thousands)	Foreign (thousands)		Total (thousands)	Foreign (thousands)	
Total/average	361,005	19,918	6	145,748	7,835	5
Austria	8,099	737	9	3,303	327	10
Belgium	10,253	892	9	4,261	375	9
Denmark	5,333	256	5	2,938	94	3
France	57,095	3,597	6	26,016	1,587	6
Germany	82,247	7,320	9	27,714	2,522	9
Ireland	3,700	111	3	1,500	48	3
Italy	59,524	1,250	2	19,529	332	2
Luxembourg	430	153	36	234	135	58
Netherlands	15,762	662	4	7,172	208	3
Norway	4,459	165	4	2,233	67	3
Spain	40,000	720	2	15,917	191	1
Sweden	8,929	500	6	4,294	219	5
Switzerland	7,095	1,348	19	3,994	691	17
United Kingdom	58,079	2,207	4	26,641	1,039	4

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Trends in International Migration, 2000* (2001): 41.

Jamaicans emigrating to the United States are one of the oldest Caribbean migration flows. Jamaicans were recruited to work in U.S. agriculture beginning in 1943, and 10,000 to 12,000 a year arrived to cut sugar cane in Florida and pick apples on the East Coast until the mid-1990s. In 2000, there were an estimated 411,000 Jamaican-born U.S. residents.³²

Some 385,000 Haitians lived in the United States in 2000; more than one-third of them arrived in the 1990s.³³ Beginning in the late 1970s, Haitians began to make the 720-mile trip by boat to Florida, and 25,000 Haitians arrived in summer 1980. In 1991, the president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by the military, and large numbers of Haitians began leaving for the United States in boats. The United States restored Aristide to power in 1994, but when economic conditions failed to improve, many Haitians headed for the United States, often via the Bahamas. There were also at least 500,000 Haitian migrants in the neighboring Dominican Republic in 2001, many living there illegally.

Puerto Ricans have been U.S. citizens since 1917, and may move freely between Puerto Rico and the U.S. mainland. In 1998, there were about 2.7 million residents of Puerto Rican origin on the U.S. mainland, and 3.8 million in Puerto Rico. Migration between the island and the mainland responds to changing economic conditions, especially in New York and Chicago, where most Puerto Ricans on the mainland live. Higher wages and lower unemployment on the mainland encouraged emigration until the mid-1970s, when minimum wages in Puerto Rico were raised, and job creation in Puerto Rico was induced by special tax breaks. In the 1980s and 1990s, a combination of a narrowing wage gap as well as the greater availability of Food Stamps and other assistance in Puerto Rico reduced net migration to practically zero.³⁴

South America

During the 19th century, many Europeans migrated to South America to take advantage of new economic opportunities. Argentina, which attracted thousands European immigrants, was one of the richest coun-

tries in the world at the end of the 19th century. In the 21st century, however, some of the descendents of these immigrants are returning to Europe because of political and economic turmoil in Latin America. Several million Argentines, in a population of 37 million, are the children or grandchildren of Italian or Spanish citizens and entitled to dual nationality.³⁵

The severe economic problems in 2002 may also prompt more Argentines to move to the United States. Argentina is one of 29 countries in the U.S. visa-waiver pilot program, meaning that Argentines do not need visas to enter the United States.

Many of those leaving are professionals frustrated by not being paid salaries, and by a freeze on their bank savings until 2005. A poll by the Buenos Aires-based Equis research group found that one-third of Argentines would leave if they could. Those most likely to go were ages 30 to 42 and had at least a high school education. During the 1990s, Argentina attracted immigrants from Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay to fill service and construction jobs. But many migrants from nearby countries are returning home because of the deteriorating economy and high unemployment rates in Argentina.³⁶

Colombia is South America's second-largest country (after Brazil), and is a major source of immigrants. Many Colombians are emigrating because of frustration with a prolonged economic recession and fear of personal danger from persistent civil violence. Some 1.1 million of Colombia's 40 million people have left since 1996 for the United States, as well as for Ecuador, Australia, Canada, Spain, and Costa Rica. There are more than 2 million Colombians in Venezuela.³⁷

Europe

Most North and South American societies were shaped by immigration from Europe, while most European societies were shaped by emigration to the Americas—about 60 million Europeans emigrated between 1820 and

1914.³⁸ Within Europe, there was a significant migration from east to west—from Poland to Germany, for example—during the great Atlantic migration to the Americas. World wars led to new countries and the shifting of national boundaries, which generated large movements of people who found themselves in the “wrong” country. Economically motivated migration in the first half of the 20th century was dominated by movements between a home country such as France or the United Kingdom (UK) and provinces or territories and colonies abroad, such as Algeria, India, and Pakistan.

Europe became a destination for guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, and has been an important destination for refugees and immigrants since the 1980s. In 1998, there were nearly 20 million foreigners living in countries of Western Europe (see Table 3). Immigration has helped forestall population decline in many European countries, where deaths often outnumber births because of low fertility rates and an elderly age structure.

Foreigners are not distributed uniformly across Europe. Germany has less than one-fourth of the EU's population of 375 million, for example, but it has 36 percent of the EU's foreigners.

“Foreigner” conveys a different meaning in Europe than in North America. In Europe, citizenship is often conferred by blood, not by place of birth as it is in the United States and Canada. Persons born in the United States and Canada, even those born to unauthorized foreign parents, are automatically citizens. Until 2000, in contrast, a baby born in Germany to foreign parents was a foreigner according to German law; more than one-fifth of the 7.3 million foreigners living in Germany in 2000 were German-born, but to foreign parents.³⁹

While a person with Turkish parents born and raised in Germany would be considered a foreigner, a person born and raised in Russia with German parents or grandparents

would be considered German. Such foreign-born ethnic Germans have a right to move into the country, obtain a German passport, and receive financial support while they get settled. This means that the 3 million ethnic Germans who moved to Germany in the 1980s and 1990s from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are not considered immigrants, even though many of them do not speak German.

Luxembourg has Europe's highest percentage of foreigners—36 percent of its residents are foreigners, generally from nearby Belgium, France, and Germany—and almost 60 percent of its workers are foreigners (see Table 3, page 16). Switzerland, which is not a member of the EU, has 19 percent foreign residents and 17 percent foreign workers, reflecting the presence of United Nations (UN) offices in Geneva as well as the reliance of Swiss tourist, construction, and farming industries on foreign workers. Belgium has a high percentage of foreign residents and workers from other European countries, in part because Brussels is the headquarters city of the EU. Also, Belgium has recruited foreign guest workers in the past.

The movement of between 500,000 and 1 million migrants a year in Europe during the 1990s made migration a major social and political issue in many European countries. Fear and distrust of immigrants has fueled anti-immigrant political parties—such as the Freedom Party in Austria and the Northern League in Italy—and sparked debate about whether to include these parties in coalition governments. In other countries, the debate over immigration was marked by violent attacks on foreigners. In Germany, the rapid influx of asylum seekers in the 1990s prompted attacks by German nationals who wanted “foreigners out.” Attacks have continued, especially in the former East Germany, even though the number of asylum seekers has tapered off in recent years. The United Kingdom and France have experienced riots between police and second-genera-

tion immigrant youth living in communities that have few jobs.⁴⁰

Phases of Migration

Europe was transformed from an emigration to an immigration region in several phases.⁴¹ The first phase, from 1945 to 1960, was dominated by the resettlement of millions of displaced persons and refugees, including the return from eastern Europe of some 13 million ethnic Germans to what was then West Germany, and migration from former colonies to the homeland, from Indonesia to the Netherlands, for example.

The second phase, from 1961 to 1974, was the guest worker era. Western European nations such as France and Germany recovered from wartime destruction much faster than expected, and well ahead of southern European countries. In the early 1960s, when the number of vacant jobs exceeded the number of unemployed workers, Western European governments allowed employers to recruit foreign guest workers in Italy, Spain, and other southern European countries, where unemployment was high. The idea that a “United States of Europe” was in the making was strengthened by the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, which guaranteed workers of member nations the right to work anywhere in the EEC, so that an Italian and German applying for a job at VW or BMW factories in Germany were to be considered equally.

Most guest workers received one- or two-year work and residence permits.⁴² The guest workers were expected to work for high wages for several years, and then return to their home countries and use their savings to expand farms or launch small businesses, stimulating economic and job growth. Theoretically, migration would be unnecessary in the future because there would be enough good jobs at home. But the economic boom in Western Europe persisted longer than expected, and soon trains and planes were bringing several thousand migrants each day to

France and Germany. As Italy's economy blossomed in the late 1960s, fewer Italians had to leave to find jobs, and Western European employers turned to such countries as Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Turkey to recruit workers. By 1973, more than 10 percent of all employed workers in Germany were foreigners.

In 1973, the major petroleum-exporting countries quadrupled the price of oil on the international market, creating an economic crisis in Europe and the rest of the world. Western European governments stopped recruiting guest workers because employers were cutting back production and economic growth had stalled. Many guest workers already in Europe lost their jobs, but they did not return home as expected. Their countries of origin, such as Yugoslavia and Turkey, had also been pushed into recession by higher oil prices, and jobs were scarce. Long-term guest workers had earned the right to stay in France and Germany, even if they were unemployed. Many migrants decided to stay in Europe rather than return home where there were fewer jobs and less of a social safety net. Instead, the foreign workers brought their families to join them in Western Europe, setting off the third phase of European migration.

Migration into Western Europe changed from the movement of mostly male workers to the entry of the wives and children of foreign workers. Their presence raised new social and political issues, such as how to treat Muslim women and girls who wore veils, and whether to teach the children of these "temporary" guest workers in French and German or in their native Arabic or Turkish. Both France and Germany tried to encourage migrants to return to their home countries. They offered cash payments to workers who left (often refunds of their social security contributions), denied work permits to spouses of guest workers for several years after their arrival, and allowed foreigners to bring in only their children age 16 or younger. Most of these efforts to discourage family unification

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
The prediction of a shortage of jobs for Turkish citizens, such as this welder, has evoked fear of heavy emigration to Europe if Turkey joins the European Union.

and encourage returns failed, and immigrant communities in Europe expanded.

As family unification was completed in the mid-1980s, three developments unleashed a fourth wave of migrants between 1986 and 1993. First, an economic boom increased the number of, and toleration for, unauthorized foreigners, such as those who arrived as tourists from Turkey to visit relatives, and stayed to work without work permits.

Second, foreigners waiting for guest worker recruitment to restart learned about a new legal route into Western Europe: requesting asylum. Immigrants could enter Germany from Turkey, for example, and apply for asylum. Most asylum cases are rejected, but the applicants can remain for several years while appealing their case. Most countries have established systems in which judges hear each applicant's case, listen to why the person fled, and recommend whether asylum should be granted or refused. The decision can be appealed. Between 1983 and 2000, some 5.7 million foreigners applied for asylum in Europe, with peak numbers between 1989 and 1993. One-half of all the cases were in Germany (see Figure 5, page 20).

Figure 5
Asylum Applicants in Germany and Europe, 1983-2000



Sources: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee, and Migration Policies, Geneva.

Most applicants (85 percent or more) were not given asylum, but while awaiting a decision, asylum seekers were enrolled in the welfare system. They received housing and food but did not have the right to work. Many native-born Europeans, especially Germans, were angered by the growing concentrations of idle young men and families in their cities. Violent attacks against foreigners increased. This anti-immigrant sentiment prompted Germany to more actively discourage asylum seekers from entering. In 1993, Germany declared that foreigners who passed through “safe countries” en route to Germany had to apply for asylum in the first safe country they reached, which was more likely to be Poland, Austria, or some other country, but not Germany. As a result, the number of asylum applications dropped sharply in Germany after 1994.⁴³

The third contributor to the new wave of immigration was the fall of communism. As eastern European nations began to relax restrictions on emigration in the late 1980s, Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians made their way west, where they were generally welcomed. But as the number of per-

sons escaping from behind the Iron Curtain accelerated, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 11, 1989, Western Europeans began to resent the Romanians, Bulgarians, and others entering their countries. Those immigrants who went to work were viewed as taking jobs from Western Europeans, and labor unions complained of unfair competition. In the early 1990s, some analysts predicted that millions of Russians would soon be migrating west, especially to Germany, where ethnic Germans had a right of return. In response, Germany slapped a quota on the number of ethnic Germans who could arrive each year, and Austria put military forces on the border to prevent illegal immigration.

Schengen and EU Enlargement

European countries in the early 1990s recognized that national efforts were incapable of managing migration in an integrating Europe because the actions and policies of one country affected others. If France refused to give refugee status to some persons fleeing persecution, such as Afghans fleeing the Taliban, for example, Afghans might travel through France to the UK, where they could be recognized as refugees or be granted exceptional leave to stay in the UK. Such differences between countries led to regional efforts to deal with migration, most of which were coordinated by the EU.⁴⁴ The Dublin Convention of 1990, for example, required foreigners seeking asylum to apply in the first EU country they reached in an effort to prevent migrants from traveling by boat to Greece or Italy, which provide few benefits to asylum seekers, and then continuing north to Germany or Scandinavia, where benefits for asylum seekers were better.

The Schengen Agreement of 1985 was an early effort to develop a common immigration policy for Europe. The policy was slow to evolve, largely because it required member nations to agree on a common list of countries whose citizens required visas; common criteria for issuing visas to

foreigners; and the development of a common database, the Schengen Information System, available to border inspectors in every country. The Schengen Agreement went into effect in 1995, and now includes all EU-member states except Ireland and the UK. Ireland and the UK are island states that want to continue to check all incoming persons to minimize the need for internal controls. On the continent of Europe, the Schengen Agreement means that passengers arriving in Paris or Frankfurt from outside Europe are inspected, but they are not inspected again if they fly on to Brussels or Rome.

In the 21st century, the EU is embarked on efforts to develop a common policy on immigration. The Amsterdam Treaty, for example, which went into effect in 1999, commits the EU to develop a common immigration and asylum policy by 2004. The goals of this EU-wide policy, which will also apply to new members in eastern and southern Europe who join the EU, include the efficient management of migration; coordinated pursuit of smugglers of migrants, especially of women; and common policies to deal with foreigners who request asylum.

Many EU nations have launched aggressive campaigns against smuggling and trafficking—smuggling is defined as moving migrants over borders for profit, and trafficking is smuggling plus exploitation such as forcing migrants into prostitution or slavery. The most visible smuggling and trafficking cases occur when tragedies are discovered, or when ships filled with migrants sink or run aground. In June 2000, 58 Chinese migrants died in a sealed container on a truck arriving in the UK from Belgium. In February 2001, a Cambodian-registered ship carrying 912 Kurds, including 400 children, was deliberately run aground on the French Riviera near Nice; the migrants had paid \$500 to \$1,000 each to be smuggled to Europe. The captain and crew abandoned the ship, and the migrants were rescued by French police. Most of these migrants applied for asylum.

There are an estimated 300,000 mostly eastern European and African women working as prostitutes in Western Europe, where there is a growing demand for younger females presumed to be free of AIDS. Many such women are lured to Western Europe by brokers who promise them dancing or restaurant jobs. The traffickers then take away their passports, and threaten the women and their families if they attempt to run away.⁴⁵ To encourage the victimized women to report the traffickers, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands offer immigrant visas to women who aid in the prosecution of their traffickers. Italy offered 2,000 women immigrant status in 2000 and 2001 under this program, which led to the identification of organized gangs from Albania and Nigeria that were smuggling women into Italy.

To prevent population and labor force declines, many European leaders want an immigration policy that welcomes newcomers. In a speech on July 12, 2000, European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino said “the European Union is facing a changing economic and demographic situation ... the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are not working.” Vitorino urged EU nations to agree “on new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU, recognizing their contribution ... [but] avoid the creation of new ghettos in our towns and cities.”

Could immigration stave off population decline in Western Europe? The UN Population Division estimated the number of immigrants that various countries would have to admit in order to maintain their 1995 populations, labor forces, and ratios of younger to older persons.

The results show that immigration would have to increase dramatically to prevent population and labor force changes. The four largest EU countries—France, Germany, Italy, and the UK—include about 66 percent of EU residents, for example, but received about 88 percent of EU immigrants in 1995. If they wanted to maintain

Many EU nations have launched active campaigns against migrant smugglers.

Table 4

Immigration Required to Avoid Population Decline in the European Union, 2000-2050

Country	Migrants required annually from 2000 to 2050 to maintain:						
	Immigrants in 1995 (thousands)	1995 population		1995 working-age population		Population support ratio*	
		Migrants (thousands)	Multiple of 1995 immigration	Migrants (thousands)	Multiple of 1995 immigration	Migrants	Multiple of 1995 immigration
European Union (EU)	270	949	4	1,588	6	13,480	50
Four largest EU countries	237	677	3	1,093	5	8,884	37
France	7	29	4	109	16	1,792	256
Germany	204	344	2	487	2	3,630	18
Italy	6	251	42	372	62	2,268	378
United Kingdom	20	53	3	125	6	1,194	60
Eleven other EU countries	33	272	8	495	15	4,596	139
United States	760	128	0	359	0	11,851	16

*Migrants necessary to maintain 1995 ratio of persons ages 15-64 to those age 65 or older. Multiples are rounded to nearest whole number.

Source: United Nations, "Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Aging Population?" (www.un.org/esa/population/publications/publications.htm, accessed May 7, 2001).

their 1995 populations (given current fertility rates), they would have to triple immigration levels, from 237,000 a year to 677,000 a year, with the greatest increase needed in Italy (see Table 4). To maintain their 1995 labor forces, immigration would have to increase to 1.1 million a year. Finally, to "save social security," which means maintaining the same ratio of persons ages 15 to 64 to persons ages 65 or older, immigration would have to increase 37-fold, to almost 9 million a year.

The 15-nation European Union had a 2000 population of 380 million and a labor force of 170 million. Fertility is below replacement levels in all EU member nations, so that, without immigration, EU populations and labor forces are projected to shrink. However, most Europeans do not want more immigration, even to prevent population and labor force declines. EU nations are currently receiving 300,000 to 500,000 legal newcomers a year, including returning citizens, family members of settled foreigners, guest workers, and asylum applicants, plus up to 500,000 unauthorized foreigners, not all of whom settle permanently in Europe. Unemployment rates for foreigners from outside the EU are often two to three times higher than for native-

born residents and EU nationals. Increasing immigration flows or legalizing unauthorized foreigners tends to produce strong political opposition.⁴⁶

The EU plans to accept 12 more eastern European countries within five years and eventually to add another 10 or 12 members, probably including Turkey. The concern expressed by some Europeans that expansion of the EU will generate more immigration into Western Europe are supported by a recent study that estimated that 335,000 workers from all of eastern Europe would migrate west right after admission into the EU. The number of migrants would shrink to 160,000 a year by 2010, according to the study, with 80 percent of the migrants moving to Austria and Germany.⁴⁷

Austria and Germany have insisted that the EU prevent immigration from new eastern European members for at least two years (2005 to 2006). After this two-year wait, the current 15 EU members could individually prevent freedom of movement for another three years (2007 to 2009), and then for another two years, for a maximum seven-year wait, until 2011. Eastern European countries wanting to join the EU eventually accepted the proposed restrictions.

Turkey, a country of 67 million, plus 3.5 million Turks abroad, would also like to join the EU, and is listed as the 13th enlargement candidate.⁴⁸ If admitted, Turkey would probably be the most populous EU country by 2025, when its population is projected to surpass Germany's. Negotiations for Turkey's membership have not yet begun, in part because many EU member nations fear a wave of migrants from Turkey. In the early 1970s' guest worker era, about 2 million young Turkish men went abroad for employment, equivalent to 40 percent of young Turkish men in 1970.⁴⁹ Today, an estimated 25 percent to 35 percent of the young men would seek jobs abroad if they could. Young Turkish women have also expressed interest in working in Europe. The prospect of a flood of Turkish migrants is expected to slow Turkey's efforts to join the EU.⁵⁰

Countries such as Germany are attempting to increase the number of skilled and professional migrants, in contrast to earlier policies that brought less skilled workers. During the dot.com boom in 2000, the German computer industry complained of labor shortages, and the government responded with a "green card" program that offered five-year work permits to foreign computer professionals who were paid at least DM100,000 (US\$45,000) a year.⁵¹ About 8,000 green cards were issued in the first year of the program, and the government used the green card program to set the stage for Germany's first planned immigration system—a July 4, 2001, proposal to admit up to 50,000 additional immigrants a year.⁵² Some of these immigrants would be selected through a point system, some would be given five-year permits that could eventually lead to permanent residence status, and some (especially graduates of German universities) would be granted immigrant status if they were hired by German employers. The German government hoped to enact Germany's first immigration law before the end of 2001, but failed.

Managing migration is a challenge for an aging Europe in the 21st century. As foreigners arrive, European nations must decide what it means to be Dutch or German, and how newcomers should be integrated into societies steeped in history and culture. The process of managing migration may be facilitated by EU-wide decisionmaking, which can make the changes associated with migration easier to accept, much as the new currency, the Euro, is easier to accept because it brings change in most European nations at the same time.

Asia

Asia, home to 60 percent of the world's population, is a major source of immigrants for North America and Europe (see Figure 2, page 9). Asia also has substantial intraregional migration: Thais migrate to Taiwan for jobs, for example. The region has the world's largest rural-to-urban migration, the 130 million migrants within China (see Box 2, page 24).⁵³ Demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors are expected to significantly increase the number of economic and noneconomic migrants in the 21st century.

Immigration policy reforms in Canada and the United States in the mid-1960s allowed easier entry for Asian professionals who wanted to emigrate. There was also an upsurge in emigration as a result of the Vietnam War and the resettlement of refugees outside Asia, many of whom were later joined by family members. However, most Asian migrants move from one Asian country to another to fill jobs. This migration-for-employment expanded sharply after oil price hikes in the 1970s created boom economies in the petroleum-producing countries of the Middle East. About 10,000 Asians migrated to the Gulf nations of the Middle East for jobs in 1971, and 1 million moved there in 1981.⁵⁴ As the demand for labor in nations such as Saudi Arabia stabilized, migrants tended to move closer to home: Filipinos migrated to

Migration Within China

China, home to more than 20 percent of the world's 6 billion residents, is a poor and predominantly rural country. The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was US\$800 in 1999, compared with US\$31,000 in the United States. The 800 million Chinese living in villages in rural areas are much poorer than the 500 million Chinese in cities, and many want to leave the countryside to seek better opportunities. But China restricts movement within the country, and even after China's household registration system was relaxed in 1994, internal migration is difficult. It is hard for rural migrants to obtain housing, education, and government services outside the area in which they are registered.

Despite the restrictions and economic penalties associated with migration, more young people in rural China are moving to the cities and to southeastern coastal provinces such as Guangdong, where there are hundreds of factories established by Hong Kong firms to make toys and other products for export. In mid-2001, an estimated 130 million Chinese were living away from the places where they were registered, making the number of internal Chinese migrants almost as large as the number of international migrants.

Internal Chinese migrants are much like international migrants—they are encouraged to move by demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors. Dire conditions in villages prompt the rural exodus: "In villages across central and southern China incomes have stagnated, most young people migrate to coastal cities to perform menial jobs, and local governments are so short of money that officials and teachers often go unpaid for months at a time."¹

Male migrants are often employed in construction, while female migrants often find jobs in factories. Migrants in coastal areas earn US\$2 to US\$3 a day, far more than they could earn farming. But many migrants are subject to what they say is police harassment—those without correct registration papers can be sentenced to three- to six-month terms of work in prison factories. Most migrants cannot afford city work per-

mits, which can cost from \$6,000 to \$12,000. They maintain their links to their villages, in part out of fear that they may be forced back to the countryside.

Internal migration is expected to increase after China joins the World Trade Organization. Freer trade is expected to increase foreign investment in China, creating jobs in factories, but it also may speed up the movement off the land, as cheaper farm products enter China.

Some analysts also expect an increase in illegal international migration, generally involving smuggling. During the 1990s, several boatloads of illegal Chinese immigrants landed in the United States and Canada, sparking fears of massive emigration from China, and revealing the existence of active smuggling rings. The ship *Golden Venture* ran aground in New York City in 1993 with several hundred Chinese migrants on board. The migrants, most of whom later applied for asylum in the United States, had paid US\$50,000 or more each to be smuggled into the United States.²

Canada, the United States, and Europe want China to crack down on smugglers. China counters that, if these countries did not offer asylum to Chinese claiming persecution because they are members of the banned religious group Falun Gong, or claiming they fear forced abortions for having a second child, smugglers would not find it so easy to recruit migrants to be smuggled abroad.³ China remains a leading source of international migrants to the United States and Canada.

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Table 5

Migrants in Labor-Importing Countries in Asia, 2000

Country	National labor force	Foreign population (thousands)	Total migrant workers	Legal migrant workers	Migrant worker share of national labor force (percent)	Migrant workers with legal status (percent)
Total	149,170	6,550	4,824	3,508	3	73
Hong Kong	3,380	400	300	235	9	78
Japan	68,000	1,700	670	420	1	63
South Korea	22,000	350	310	95	1	31
Malaysia	9,600	1,500	1,239	789	13	64
Taiwan	10,000	350	345	329	3	96
Thailand	34,000	1,250	1,000	700	3	70
Singapore	2,190	1,000	960	940	44	98

Note: Legal migrant workers are foreign workers (1) with work permits and (2) considered to be workers under labor law. Total migrant workers are legal migrants plus students and trainees and unauthorized workers.

Source: Government data and estimates summarized in *Migration News*, various issues.

Hong Kong to work as maids, for example, or to Malaysia to work in agriculture or construction.

Because Asia includes some of the world's most rapidly aging nations, such as Japan, and leading countries of emigration, such as the Philippines and China, large-scale migration is likely to continue to match labor demand in one country with supply in another. Most Asian nations assert that they are not countries of immigration—they especially do not want permanent immigrants—which means that the migrants are generally given guest worker or similar labels to suggest that they will eventually return home. Asian nations vary widely in their policies toward migrants. In South Korea, 31 percent of the migrant workers are legal guest workers, compared with 98 percent in Singapore (see Table 5).

City-States: Singapore and Hong Kong

The city-state of Singapore had almost 1 million foreigners among its 2.2 million workers in 2000. Government policy is to welcome foreign professionals, giving them long-term residence permits, allowing them to bring their families, and sometimes subsidizing their travel to Singapore. But the unskilled Malaysians, Indonesians, and Filipinos who dominate the migrant work force are tightly

regulated and heavily taxed.

Unskilled migrants are not allowed to bring their families to Singapore to live or even to visit. Female migrants are subject to pregnancy tests and sent home if they become pregnant. Even marrying a Singaporean citizen does not guarantee a migrant the right to stay in Singapore.

Employers of migrants must pay a levy or tax equivalent to half of a worker's monthly wage. The purpose of the levy is to encourage Singaporean employers to look hard for local workers or find ways to get work done without migrants. Singapore has no minimum wages, so many critics allege that employers simply pay migrants less because of the levy. Migrants are nonetheless eager to come because even levy-reduced wages in Singapore are higher than they could earn at home. Both employers and migrants are subject to fines and physical punishment for violating immigration laws.

Hong Kong is another city-state heavily dependent on migrants. Some 235,000 of Hong Kong's migrants are domestic helpers, employed by Hong Kong families to cook and take care of children. Most of the foreign maids are Filipinos; they are often college graduates who pay labor brokers about 25 percent of the earnings they expect during their two years in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has minimum

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The number of Chinese moving from poor rural areas to seek jobs in the cities rivals the number of international migrants worldwide. Most rural migrants move to coastal cities where there are factory and construction jobs.

wages, which were HK\$3,670 (US\$471) a month, plus room and board, for domestic helpers in 2001. But Hong Kong residents are trying to get this minimum reduced, citing economic strains related to the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.

Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of China in 1997, but migration between the mainland and Hong Kong remains strictly regulated. Under Hong Kong's Basic Law, children born on the Chinese mainland to at least one Hong Kong parent have the right to move to Hong Kong, but only after they and their mainland parent receive exit permits (called certificates of entitlements) from mainland authorities. Only 150 family unification permits a day are available and the wait to unify families can be very long, prompting some mainland residents to go to Hong Kong as tourists and stay. In a highly publicized case in 1999, the National People's Congress in Beijing, at the request of a Hong Kong government that feared too many migrants, overturned a decision of Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal that would have expanded the right of abode in Hong Kong of mainland residents.⁵⁵

Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan

Malaysia and Thailand each have more than 1 million migrants, and they have very different policies toward them. Both countries share hard-to-control borders with much poorer states: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar (Burma). Migrants make up a far higher share of the work force in Malaysia than in Thailand, however. Malaysia's work force is less than 10 million, one-third that of Thailand. Migrants do most of the work on Malaysian plantations that produce rubber and palm oil, as well as in construction and increasingly in the factories that assemble computers for export. The Malaysian government, which reported 789,000 legal migrants in 2001, announces periodic crackdowns on illegal workers and threatens not to renew the work permits of legal guest workers, but usually relents after employers argue that, without the migrants, they would go out of business.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 began in Thailand, when foreigners stopped lending money that was often being used for projects that proved to be noncompetitive. As production slowed and unemployment rose sharply, the Thai government announced that it would crack down on unauthorized foreign workers in order to open up jobs for unemployed Thais. This effort to substitute Thai for Burmese workers largely failed. Thailand is the world's major rice exporter, and most of the workers who carry 100-kilogram (220-pound) bags of rice from the mills to trucks were Burmese. When the government stopped allowing Burmese to carry rice, Thai workers were hired, but they complained that the bags were too heavy. The government suggested that employers reduce the bags' weight to 50 kilograms (110 pounds), but mill owners refused. The Thai government relented, and Burmese migrants continue to be employed in rice mills and plantations and on fishing boats.

Migrants first arrived in Taiwan in 1990 to help construct high-priority

infrastructure projects, such as roads. Instead of returning home when these construction projects were completed, migrants soon found jobs in factories, and then in private households. By April 2001, the number of legal foreign workers in Taiwan hit a record 329,000, including 101,000 in domestic service, 181,000 in manufacturing, and 36,000 in construction. Most of the migrants were from Thailand (42 percent) and the Philippines (28 percent). Taiwan does not accept migrants from the Chinese mainland.⁵⁶

Japan and Korea

Japan and South Korea attract many foreign immigrants, but have few policies to deal with them. Most immigrants in these two countries are treated as students and trainees who receive below-minimum wages, or are tolerated as unauthorized workers. In 2001, there were 670,00 foreign workers in Japan, excluding permanent residents and spouses of Japanese nationals. Some 120,000 were professionals, including 32,000 entertainers and 16,000 engineers. There were three other major immigrant groups: 220,000 Nikkeijin, descendants of Japanese migrants to Brazil and Peru early in the 20th century; 80,000 trainees, most from China; and 250,000 unauthorized foreign workers—about one-quarter of whom were Korean.

Japan is grappling for an immigration policy as its population ages. Japan has 127 million people, including 26 million age 65 or older. The number of elderly is growing by 1 million a year. If Japan's fertility remains at its current low total—women have a total of 1.3 children, on average—the government projected that the population could shrink to 100 million by 2050 unless there is more immigration, an increase in births, or both.⁵⁷ Several national commissions have recommended that Japan open itself to immigration to slow aging and population decline.

Opening Japan to immigration would introduce more diversity into what is today one of the world's most

Table 6

Leading Labor-Exporting Countries in Asia, 2000

Country	National labor force (thousands)	Workers abroad (thousands)	Labor force members per worker abroad
Total	948,600	10,900	87
China	720,000	500	1,440
Indonesia	95,700	1,500	64
Philippines	30,900	7,000	4
Bangladesh	63,000	1,600	39
Vietnam	39,000	300	130

Source: Official government sources summarized in *Migration News* (<http://migration.ucdavis.edu>, accessed Dec. 19, 2001).

homogeneous nations. Japan already struggles to integrate its foreign population, and problems are often reported in the media. In 2001, a U.S.-born Japanese national and his friend were barred from using a spa at a hot spring in Hokkaido, Japan. They persuaded the spa to modify its policy only after threatening to sue. The spa now admits foreigners who have lived in Japan for more than one year and understand Japanese language and customs.⁵⁸

As in Japan, most foreign workers in South Korea arrived as trainees, and are now unauthorized. The major employers of migrants are small and mid-sized firms offering so-called 3-D jobs: dirty, dangerous, and difficult. The Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) has administered the trainee program since 1994, which admits 80,000 foreigners a year to work for relatively low wages of about US\$600 a month for two years. If they leave the program and work illegally, in construction, for example, they can earn far more. In June 2001, there were 311,000 migrants in South Korea, including 216,000 illegal migrants, most of whom were run-away trainees. The KFSB said that, “despite the rising unemployment rate, domestic workers still appear reluctant to jump into the 3-D jobs. In other words, the foreign industrial trainees are really helping small businesses reduce labor costs.”⁵⁹

Some South Korean employers take away trainee passports, retain

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These and thousands of other Afghans entered Pakistan in October 2001 to escape war and political violence. At least 2 million Afghan refugees moved to Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the 1990s.

some of their wages, and take other steps to keep their trainees from running away. These actions have also prompted complaints that the workers are being abused. The Korean government wants to turn the trainees into foreign workers entitled to minimum wages and the same benefits as Korean workers, but the KFSB opposes turning trainees into guest workers, arguing that it would increase labor costs.

Labor Exporters

The Philippines is the major labor exporter in Asia followed at some distance by Bangladesh and Indonesia (see Table 6, page 27). According to the Philippine government, there are 77 million Filipinos at home and 7 million abroad; they send home US\$7 billion a year, equivalent to 10 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In recognition of the importance of migrant remittances to the economy, the Filipino president usually welcomes returning migrants at Christmas in a *Pamas-kong Handog sa OFWs* ("welcome home overseas foreign workers") ceremony. Filipino migrant workers are especially prominent as nurses and domestic helpers, and on the world's commercial ships. Unlike most other labor-exporters,

more than half of the migrants the Philippines sends abroad each year are women.

In theory, labor emigration is a temporary stage in the economic development of a low-income country. Migrants go abroad because there are not enough jobs at home; they send home some of their earnings, which help fuel economic growth and create job opportunities. Eventually, large-scale labor migration is unnecessary because there are sufficient jobs at home. But this transition is not assured. Pozorrubia for example, is a Philippine city of 60,000 about 200 miles north of Manila, with 10 percent of its residents employed overseas. The remittances foreign workers send home are used for better housing, appliances, and education. But not enough jobs are being created to keep the young people from leaving the country.⁶⁰

Philippine labor secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas said in 2001 that the "government will be taking on an even more active role in pushing overseas employment as a strategy to boost economic growth and bring about full employment."⁶¹

Middle East

The Middle East, which stretches from western Asia to northern Africa, has witnessed some of the world's largest population and labor flows in the past 50 years, measured in per capita terms. Although it makes up just 6 percent of world population in the early 21st century, the Middle East contains nearly 45 percent of the world's refugees (see Figure 6). The Middle East included 1.5 million Afghan refugees in 2000, primarily in Iran. The world's largest refugee population also lives in the Middle East primarily in Gaza, Jordan, the West Bank, and neighboring countries.⁶²

After world oil prices rose sharply in the 1970s, millions of foreign workers immigrated to the oil-exporting countries to fill the jobs created by higher oil revenues. Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting countries


embarked on a building boom and hired foreign workers to help build airports, hospitals, and roads. These workers included Arabs from countries such as Egypt and Jordan, and Asians from nearby Pakistan and India as well as the Philippines and Indonesia. Most of the oil exporters planned to reduce the number of migrant workers as soon as construction projects were completed. This did not happen—foreign workers continued to be 60 percent to 90 percent of the workers in most oil-exporting countries.

In 2001, foreigners were 70 percent of the 10-million-strong Saudi labor force. Saudi Arabia's population grows by 3.4 percent a year, and half of all Saudis are under age 18. The government in the past guaranteed jobs to Saudis, but as oil prices stabilized and labor force growth increased, the money ran out. The unemployment rate was at least 18 percent in 2001, and was much higher among younger Saudis.⁶³ The economic crunch has prompted the Saudi government to periodically attempt to “renationalize” the work force, largely by increasing the fees that employers must pay in order to hire foreign workers and reserving some jobs for Saudis. Renationalization has failed to reduce dependence on foreign workers, however, in part because many Saudi youth shun private-sector jobs, and private-sector employers prefer foreign workers who will work longer hours for less money. In addition, many Saudis make money from importing foreign workers: They sponsor migrants who want to enter Saudi Arabia at \$1,000 or more per person.

Other oil-exporting countries face similar problems: fast-growing populations, a tradition of providing make-work government jobs for nationals, and migrant admissions systems that enrich some local residents. All of the Persian Gulf oil exporters have announced plans to reduce dependence on labor migrants, but none has reduced foreigners to less than 50 percent of their work force. Hundreds of foreign workers left Kuwait during the

Figure 6

World Refugee Population by Region, 2000



Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 2001* (2001): Table 2.

1990-1991 Gulf War, for example, when the United States led a coalition to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government vowed to never again become dependent on foreign workers, especially since some foreign workers had welcomed the Iraqis into Kuwait as liberators. By 2001, however, foreigners were once again 40 percent of Kuwait's residents, and a majority of its workers.

Israel is a special case because it welcomes Jewish immigrants from around the world in accordance with its *aliyah*, or law of return. Between 1948 and 2000, some 3 million immigrants arrived; 20 percent later emigrated. Immigration to Israel increased rapidly after 1989. Between 1989 and 2000, Israel received 1 million immigrants, increasing the population to more than 6 million. Many of the Jewish immigrants were well-educated professionals who helped turn Israel into a high-tech center in the region.

Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza after wars in 1973 and 1976, and allowed Palestinian residents from these areas to commute to jobs in Israel; in 1987, some 110,000 Palestinians commuted daily to Israel. As

violence between Jews and Arabs escalated in the region in the late 1980s, Israel began to limit the number of Palestinians who could commute to jobs in Israel in an effort to reduce terrorist incidents. Israel began to allow the entry of Romanians, Thais, and other foreign workers to fill the jobs once held by Palestinians. In mid-2001, about 15,000 Palestinians were permitted to commute to Israel, and about 200,000 other foreigners worked in Israel, many illegally.

Libya is another unusual case. It is an oil-exporting country of about 5 million residents that is far richer than its North African neighbors. It is considered part of the Middle East, but looks to solidify ties to sub-Saharan Africa. Libyan leader Mohammed Kadhafi has been trying to establish a United States of Africa, and in the 1990s invited black Africans to immigrate to fill jobs that were shunned by Libyans. In 2000, when there were about 1 million migrants from other African countries in Libya (half from neighboring Chad), there was widespread violence against African migrants. Local Libyan youth were reported to have attacked and killed more than 100 migrants, which prompted thousands more to flee. Kadhafi said the violence was orchestrated by the “enemies” of African unity.⁶⁴

Africa: Refugees and Migrants

Africa is often associated with massive movements of people fleeing civil wars, such as in Rwanda and Burundi in the mid-1990s. In 2000, Africa had nearly one-eighth of the world’s people, one-fourth of the world’s nation-states, and nearly one-third of the world’s 12 million refugees.⁶⁵ Many national borders in Africa were drawn by European mapmakers, who ignored traditional migration patterns of the ethnic groups and split some tribal territories between countries. The tribal structure of many African societies means that neighboring African countries sometimes host refugees from each other as

those out of favor with the government flee over national borders to avoid persecution. There are Mauritanian refugees in Mali, for example, and Malian refugees in Mauritania.

Between April and August 1994, Africa witnessed one of the largest movements of refugees ever recorded—2 million Rwandans abruptly left the country for Zaire and other neighboring states. This mass exodus was a response to a severe political crisis and genocide in Rwanda. At least 500,000 mostly ethnic Tutsi residents had been killed earlier that year in a genocide organized by the Hutu government. When the Tutsi-led rebel army defeated the Hutu government’s military forces, the leaders fled. Fearing severe retaliation for the genocide they had waged, the Hutu leaders encouraged other Hutus to flee the country with them. Many of the Hutus later returned home, but in 2000, 10 percent of the world’s refugees remained in that African region.⁶⁶

There are some hopeful signs that refugee flows may be declining in Africa. War in Mozambique produced 1.3 million refugees in the early 1990s, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and no refugees between 1998 and 1999, after the conflict was settled.⁶⁷ Similarly, Liberia was the source of 800,000 refugees in the mid-1990s, but fewer than 300,000 in the late 1990s.

In some cases refugee movements are intermingled with economically motivated migration. Côte d’Ivoire, known as the “West African Miracle,” attracts migrants from poorer neighbors such as Burkina Faso and Mali to work on cocoa and coffee plantations; in 2000, about 40 percent of the 16 million residents were foreigners. However, a military coup toppled the government in 1999, and the military leader was himself driven from office in 2000 after attempting to rig presidential elections. One candidate was not allowed to run for president because, it was alleged, he was a migrant from Burkina Faso. When it

appeared that his supporters might try to block the installation of the new president, there were widespread attacks against foreigners.⁶⁸

Côte d'Ivoire is often accused of tolerating near-slave-like conditions among child migrants from Burkina Faso and Mali on its plantations. Recruiters allegedly go to villages in Burkina Faso and Mali, where incomes are very low, and offer parents US\$50 to US\$100 in exchange for sending their children for what is called "work-and-training" in Côte d'Ivoire. The children are then sold to plantation owners, who often keep them under guard for one to two years. The International Labor Organization (ILO), which defines a slave as someone "forced to work under physical or mental threat, and where the owner or employer controls the person completely," estimates that there may be tens of thousands of migrants under 18 employed on Côte d'Ivoire plantations.⁶⁹

South Africa is the major destination for migrants in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa, a country of 42 million, is far richer than its neighbors. South African mine owners, with their operations in remote places, traditionally recruit workers from nearby countries rather than seek local workers who would have to migrate from South African cities. Some 130,000 migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique were employed in South African mines in 2001; most have 12-month contracts that pay relatively generous wages of US\$200 a month.

After apartheid ended in 1994, South African blacks had high expectations that conditions and opportunities would improve. The new government of Nelson Mandela discouraged the recruitment of foreign miners but was reluctant to deport unauthorized migrants to neighboring countries that had sheltered anti-apartheid activists before the end of white-only rule. But relatively few South Africans wanted to work in the mines—instead, there was a wave of mechanization that eased the need for miners.

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The exodus of millions of refugees from Rwanda in 1994 was one of the largest sudden movements of people in history. Many came to refugee camps, such as this one in Tanzania.

At least 3 million foreigners migrated to South Africa between 1994 and 2000.⁷⁰ As unemployment rose—to 37 percent for black men and 52 percent for black women in October 1999⁷¹—many South Africans blamed immigrants; attacks on foreigners became commonplace and opinion polls suggest that 25 percent of South Africans want a total ban on immigration. South Africa is struggling to encourage local businesses to train and retrain black workers as well as to develop an immigration policy to allow the entry of needed skilled and professional workers. South Africa faces a widening shortage of skilled labor, which is exacerbated by a high rate of adult infections with HIV (20 percent of South African adults are HIV-positive—including many educated professionals). In addition, more than 1 million skilled workers, managers and other professionals have emigrated from South Africa since 1994.

Oceania/Pacific Islands

Oceania is the world's least populous geographic region. It contains just 31 million people, two-thirds of whom

Economic development tends to stimulate migration in the short term.

live in Australia. Australia and New Zealand welcome immigrants from around the world, about 75,000 and 35,000 a year, respectively; they also permit freedom of movement between the two countries under the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement.

Australia was originally a place to which the UK shipped criminals. Beginning in 1788, some 160,000 convicts were shipped to Australian colonies. Free British and European immigrants also arrived, and immigration peaked during the gold rush era of 1851 to 1860, when 50,000 immigrants a year arrived. Until 1971, Australia had a White Australian policy that limited immigration to Europeans.

Like Canada, Australia and New Zealand select most of their immigrants on the basis of a point system that favors the entry of young and college-educated adults who speak English. In addition, Australia and New Zealand admit refugees and immigrants coming to join settled family members.

A major immigration issue in Australia is what to do about foreigners who arrive in boats seeking asylum. Since 1994, Australia has detained foreigners who arrive without documents or on small boats. Most of these boats leave from Indonesia and land on Australia's north coast. In August 2001, an Indonesian ferry with 433 Afghans and Sri Lankans aboard sank near Christmas Island, Australia. The migrants were rescued by a Norwegian cargo ship, but Australia refused to let the migrants land, a decision that was very popular with Australians but was opposed by many people elsewhere. Eventually, the rescued migrants were taken to Nauru and New Zealand, where the UNHCR will screen them to determine which individuals qualify for refugee status. Australia is paying the costs of handling the migrants in these other countries.

Anti-immigrant movements gained strength in both Australia and New Zealand in the late 1990s. In Australia, a newly elected member of Par-

liament, Pauline Hanson, warned that Australia was "in danger of being swamped by Asians ... [who] have their own culture and religion, form ghettoes and do not assimilate."⁷² Hanson formed the One Nation party, which advocates an end to immigration. The party garnered 10 percent in opinion polls in 1997, after which a series of scandals reduced its support. The New Zealand First party also opposes Asian immigration, according to leader Winston Peters, in order to protect the 523,000 Maori in New Zealand.

Most Pacific island nations have relatively few residents, often 200,000 to 400,000, and unusual migration issues. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), a U.S. territory that sets its own immigration policies, includes 28,000 CNMI natives and 42,000 foreign guest workers. This mix of local residents and guest workers reflects a deliberate policy choice: The CNMI government permits Chinese and other firms to establish garment shops on the island, import women from China and the Philippines to sew clothes, which are sent to the United States with "Made in the USA" labels.⁷³

Reducing Unwanted Migration

The world's traditional immigration nations welcome about 1.2 million immigrants a year, but the number of people crossing national borders and settling in another country is about 3 million a year. Most nations are committed to reducing the root causes of unwanted migration, which means reducing the demographic and economic differences that promote economic migration, and increasing respect for democracy and human rights to minimize the number of refugees and asylum seekers.

Most of the changes that would reduce unwanted migration lie within the less developed countries that are the source of most migrants. How-

ever, the trade, investment, and aid policies of the industrialized nations can accelerate demographic and economic changes as well as ensure respect for human rights. In the extreme, as in northern Iraq or former Yugoslavia, industrialized nations can use military force for “humanitarian intervention” to prevent unwanted migration.

Trade and Investment

Trade means that a good is produced in one country, taken over borders, and used in another. Economic theory suggests that, if countries specialize in producing those goods in which the country has a comparative advantage, the residents of all countries that trade will be better off. This means that, if Mexico can produce TV sets cheaper than the United States, and the United States can produce corn cheaper than Mexico, then Mexico should produce televisions and send them to the United States in exchange for corn. In this way, Americans get cheaper TVs and Mexicans get cheaper tortillas. With trade accelerating economic and job growth in both countries, there would be less Mexico-U.S. migration.

The U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development concluded that “expanded trade between the sending countries and the United States is the single most important remedy” for unwanted migration into the United States.⁷⁴ Many countries have embraced freer trade as a route to faster economic growth. In 2000, trade in goods and services totaled \$6.5 trillion, almost one-fourth of the world’s \$31 trillion gross national product. As trade continues to expand, economic growth should speed up, and trade in goods should replace the migration of people.

When countries suddenly embrace freer trade, the adjustments can be severe. Television factories in the United States may close as Mexican-made televisions are exported, and Mexican farmers may quit growing

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One strategy for managing migration is stricter control of borders, which could include higher fences along more of the U.S.-Mexico border.

corn as cheaper U.S. corn is imported. The displaced U.S. workers may be able to find other jobs but, since Mexicans were migrating to the United States from rural areas before freer trade in corn, some of the displaced corn farmers followed the same well-established routes to the United States. The U.S. Commission warned that “the economic development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration.”⁷⁵

This “migration hump” can be relatively smaller and short-lived if immigration and emigration countries cooperate to accelerate the pace of job creation in emigration countries. Displaced Mexican corn farmers may not emigrate to the United States if foreign investment creates jobs for them in Mexico. Foreign direct investment (FDI) that leads to factories and other job-creating workplaces is most likely to spur economic and productivity growth and reduce emigration.

FDI flows to countries where entrepreneurs think they are most likely to make profits, not necessarily to emigration areas most in need of jobs.

FDI can increase jobs and trade and reduce migration in the long term, but it may increase migration in the short term. When, for example, foreigners invest in less developed countries, they usually send managers and other professionals to help oper-

*Trade,
investment,
and aid
policies take
time to reduce
emigration
pressures.*

ate the business, which means that FDI often generates immigration of professionals. And, foreign investors may choose countries that are economically and politically stable as the best risk for their FDI. These same countries may serve as production platforms that attract foreign workers to staff the factories. Singapore and Malaysia play this role in Southeast Asia by allowing the entry of Indonesian migrants to work in FDI-created factories.

A third example illustrates how FDI may increase internal migration and thus emigration. Much of the FDI in Mexico goes into *maquiladoras*, foreign-owned assembly plants near the U.S. border. As Mexicans are displaced from agriculture in the interior of the country, many migrate northward to seek jobs in border-area *maquiladoras*.⁷⁶ Many unsuccessful job-seekers continue migrating to the United States. Similarly, much of the FDI in China goes into the same coastal provinces that send the most migrants abroad.

Aid and Intervention

Official Development Assistance (ODA) are funds given or lent to developing nations to speed their economic and job growth. In 1970, the UN recommended that donor countries contribute aid equivalent to 0.7 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP). The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are among the only countries that consistently meet the UN's aid target. The five countries that provide the most aid dollars—Japan, the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—each contributed less than 0.4 percent of their GDP in 1999.⁷⁷

The ILO and UNHCR in 1992 undertook a major project to investigate whether more ODA, or ODA delivered in a different way, could reduce unwanted emigration.⁷⁸ The project conclusions were surprising. The experts who focused on refugee-producing conflicts emphasized that the aid provided during the Cold

War often intensified and sustained the conflict, increasing the number of refugees.⁷⁹ While they did not urge less aid, they did recommend that the aid provided to assist refugees change its focus: In addition to providing aid for the relief and resettlement of refugees, they argued that aid should also be provided to reconstruct homelands to encourage repatriation or returns, and to attack the root causes of refugee-producing conflicts, causes that often lie in poverty and environmental degradation.

The experts studying the role of aid to reduce economically motivated migration also called for more aid, but aid that would be linked to economic policy reforms in recipient countries. Instead of using aid to build a dam to provide poor farmers with irrigation water, for example, aid could be used to change agricultural policies and prices so that farmers can earn a profit from farming. Several experts concluded that the most important "aid" that can be provided to stem emigration is for industrialized countries to open their borders to the goods produced in emigration countries. Too often, they noted, the industrialized countries restrict imports of labor-intensive goods such as farm commodities, garments, and shoes. If emigration countries were allowed to export these commodities, there would be more jobs and less demand for migrants in the industrialized countries.

Can ODA be increased and redirected? In a 1995 UN conference, 130 less developed nations proposed that 20 percent of ODA could be earmarked to meet basic human needs, such as building and staffing schools and hospitals—and that recipient nations would pledge to dedicate at least 20 percent of their government expenditure to these basic improvements. Instead of implementing this "20-20 formula," however, most aid discussions have focused on debt relief, which usually means that the rich countries write off the debts incurred by the most indebted less developed nations.

Trade, investment, and aid policies take time to reduce emigration pressures. They may even increase emigration pressures, at least in the short run. But economic growth eventually reduces emigration pressures. In some cases, economically motivated migration nearly ceased after the gap in wages between emigration and immigration areas narrowed. The narrowing of the wage gap between Italy and Germany by the late 1960s, for example, explains why few Italians migrated to Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Humanitarian or military intervention can also head off emigration, but the U.S. experience in Haiti since 1994 highlights the fact that trade, investment, and aid are often cheaper and surer ways to reduce emigration pressure than humanitarian intervention.⁸⁰

U.S. military intervention to restore democracy and stem migration from Haiti in 1994 cost about \$140 million a month, far more than Haiti's annual GDP. Between 1994 and 2000, the United States spent \$2.4 billion in Haiti. But Haitians continued to emigrate.

Managing Migration

International migration is a manageable global challenge. Countries seeking to manage the migration of people across their borders should keep in mind three basic facts:

- Most people never cross national borders to live or work in another country.
- Half of the world's migrants move from one less developed country to another.
- A diverse group of countries—from Italy and Spain to South Korea—have successfully made the transition from net emigration to net immigration areas.

Indeed, given large and widening economic differences between nations, the surprise may be how little, not how much, international migration occurs.

There are at least 160 million immigrants, refugees and asylees, and

authorized and unauthorized migrant workers living outside their home countries. An estimated 45 percent (about 70 million) are in industrialized countries and 80 million or so are in less developed countries. Many are unwanted in the sense that their settlement was not anticipated—as with guest workers who settled in Western Europe, or asylum seekers whose asylum applications are rejected but who nonetheless stay.

In thinking about how to manage migration, it is important to remember that most migration is analogous to water dripping, not to flooding, and this “drip migration” is most affected by economic growth and peace. Policies that promote trade, investment, aid, and respect for human rights do not eliminate the need for border controls immediately, but they do keep countries on the path toward sustained reductions in migration pressure. Abandoning or neglecting those policies because they work slowly may invite the very mass and unpredictable migration that many governments fear.


Even though most countries have embraced freer trade and investment, migration is likely to increase rather than to decrease in the next 25 years because of demographic and economic differences and ever-stronger networks.

Emigration and immigration countries face two major uncertainties about migration. In the industrialized countries, no one knows whether the immigrants arriving today will be well-integrated fellow citizens or members of an unassimilated underclass tomorrow. In the emigration countries, there is uncertainty about what can replace the safety valve of emigration. And, the \$65 billion that migrants send home each year is more than these countries receive in foreign aid.

These uncertainties could be reduced with two grand bargains, agreements in which each party does something it would not otherwise do that has a desired long-run impact. The industrialized countries are being

Figure 7

Remittances to Less Developed Countries, 1988-1999



Notes: Remittances are money sent by workers living abroad.

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks*.

transformed by immigration and other factors that are increasing inequality. One way to visualize this transformation is to remember that, throughout human history, most societies had pyramid shapes: a king or royal family on top, a small middle class, and the poor masses filling out the bottom. The great achievement of the industrialized countries in the 20th century was the development of diamond-shaped societies: The number of rich people at the top was limited by taxes, the number of poor people at the bottom was reduced with a social safety net. The result was a large group of people at the widest band of the diamond: the middle class.

In many countries today, immigrants either add to the top or the bottom of this diamond distribution, not to the middle. Immigration thus increases inequality in the destination countries. When arrayed by the best single predictor of economic success—years of education—immigrants to the United States, for example, are more likely than native-born adults to have a graduate degree or higher, but they are also less likely

than nonimmigrants to have a high school education.

To encourage the integration of immigrants and to prevent immigrant families from being trapped at the bottom income-levels of society, immigrants need education and other assistance. But such services require public spending, and it is hard to justify increased spending to integrate foreign residents if unwanted immigration is at high levels. If the United States and the EU can simultaneously reduce unwanted immigration and unauthorized migrants, their citizens would be more likely to support assistance for foreign residents. Explicitly linking control and integration could assure the public that integration assistance will help newcomers become productive citizens.

If the industrialized countries succeed in reducing unwanted immigration, what happens in less developed nations? Remittances, monies sent home by migrants abroad, doubled in the 1990s to \$65 billion (see Figure 7). If the number of new migrants going abroad falls, and migrants already abroad are better integrated, an important source of money that sustains many families and villages may be reduced. The grand bargain in this case is for industrialized countries to offer freer trade to less developed nations with declining remittances, so that foreign investment can speed up the creation of new jobs.

International migration is likely to increase in coming decades, and sending and receiving countries will need to make difficult decisions about how to manage the flow. Maintaining the status quo is not likely to ease the tensions between sending and receiving countries. Closer cooperation and integrated policies can help countries to protect their borders without obstructing the economic development and international trade that can enable the effective management of international migration.

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