PRB

New data released today by PRB and the Appalachian Regional Commission shows that rates of labor force participation, educational attainment, income, and poverty continue to improve in Appalachia.

The 14th annual update of The Appalachian Region: A Data Overview from the 2018-2022 American Community Survey draws from the latest American Community Survey and comparable 2022 Census Population Estimates. Known as “The Chartbook,” the report contains more than 300,000 data points comparing Appalachia’s regional, subregional, state, and county economic status with the rest of the nation.

Key improvements in the region’s economic indicators are as follows.

Increased income and lower poverty rates

• Poverty rates declined in every Appalachian subregion, state, and type of county (urban and rural). The region’s overall poverty rate (14.3 percent) decreased two percentage points between 2013-2017 and 2018-2022.
• Median family income increased 9.3 percent between 2013-2017 and 2018-2022, which was on par with national median income growth.
• All income measures increased for every subregion, state, and type of county (urban and rural)—even after adjusting for inflation.

Higher educational attainment and labor force participation

• The share of individuals ages 25 and older who held Bachelor’s degrees increased by three percentage points, with more than one in four Appalachian adults reaching or surpassing this level of educational attainment in 2022.
• Between 2013-2017 and 2018-2022, labor force participation increased in every Appalachian subregion and type of county (urban and rural).

Increased population growth in south

• Southern Appalachia’s population increased 11.8 percent between 2010 and 2022, which surpassed the nation’s population growth average by more than four percentage points.

Increase in broadband access

• The share of Appalachian households with at least one computer device rose 8.6 percentage points between 2013-2017 and 2018-2022, while the share with broadband internet access increased by 12.2 percentage points. Both increases surpassed the national average, with federal and state programs designed to narrow persistent gaps in digital resources likely contributing to improvements.

“We celebrate the progress Appalachia has made, including declined poverty rates and increased broadband access. However, we know that there is still much work to be done for our entire region to reach economic parity with the rest of the country,” said ARC Federal Co-Chair Gayle Manchin. “ARC will continue to prioritize the quality of life of Appalachia’s 26 million residents, and remains committed to continued collaboration across federal, state, and local levels to ensure our people have a bright future.”

Despite positive trends, several data points revealed vulnerabilities that emphasize the inequities in Appalachia compared to the rest of the nation:

Overall population decline

• Nearly 60 percent (252) of the region’s 423 counties saw a population decline between mid-2010 and mid-2022. Rural counties were especially susceptible—77 of the 107 rural Appalachian counties lost residents.

Poverty rates for children and families and specific counties

• Though regional poverty rates have declined overall, rates have stayed the same or increased in 76 Appalachian counties. Poverty rates are highest for Appalachians under 18 (19.2 percent) and ages 18-24 (22.1 percent).
• Though the percentage of Appalachian households receiving payments from the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) decreased slightly more than the national average, participation was still higher (over 13 percent) compared to all U.S. households (over 11 percent). Participation of Central Appalachian households reached more than 20 percent.
• For households with children under the age of 18, Appalachia’s SNAP participation rate (21 percent) is nearly three percentage points higher than all U.S. households.

Disability and poverty in older adults

• Appalachia’s population trends older than the nation as a whole, with individuals ages 65 and older reaching at least 19.5 percent in 292 Appalachian counties.
• Additionally, the percentage of Appalachians ages 65 and older with a disability is more than three percentage points higher than the national rate. This was also the only age group for which poverty rates increased slightly.

Despite gains in access, digital divides persist

• Even with higher-than-average increases, Appalachian households still lagged nearly four percentage points behind U.S. rates for broadband subscriptions and device ownership. In 73 Appalachian counties, households were at least 13.3 percentage points below the U.S. average for broadband subscriptions. This gap in high-speed internet connectivity impacts residents’ access to remote work, online learning, telehealth, and more.

“The data in this year’s Chartbook highlight strides being made in the Appalachian Region, with noteworthy improvements across economic, educational, and health-related measures,” said Sara Srygley, a senior research analyst at PRB. “Yet, these data also emphasize considerable variation throughout the region—particularly the persistent challenges facing rural communities.”

The data show that Appalachia’s rural areas continue to be more vulnerable than its urban areas. Appalachia’s 107 rural counties are also more uniquely challenged, compared to 841 similarly designated rural counties across the rest of the U.S. Though rural Appalachians did have higher health insurance coverage than the rest of rural America, rural Appalachian counties continue to lag behind on educational attainment, labor force participation, broadband access, household income and population growth.

The Appalachian Region: A Data Overview from the 2018-2022 American Community Survey was written by PRB and the Appalachian Regional Commission.

In addition to the written report, ARC offers companion web pages on Appalachia’s population, employment, education, income and poverty, computer and broadband access, and rural Appalachian counties compared to the rest of rural America’s counties. For more information, visit www.arc.gov/chartbook.

About the Appalachian Regional Commission

The Appalachian Regional Commission is an economic development entity of the federal government and 13 state governments focusing on 423 counties across the Appalachian Region. ARC’s mission is to innovate, partner, and invest to build community capacity and strengthen economic growth in Appalachia to help the region achieve socioeconomic parity with the nation.

(April 2002) The West Bank and Gaza are unique entities in today’s world. Parts of the two areas consist of a series of autonomous, Palestinian-governed regions. The West Bank, approximately the size of Delaware, is bordered by Israel to the west and Jordan to the east. Gaza (also called the Gaza Strip) is approximately twice the size of Washington, DC, and shares a border with Israel to the north and east and Egypt to the south.

Political History

Britain ruled the area it called Palestine after World War I under a mandate from the League of Nations. Following Britain’s withdrawal in 1948, war broke out between Palestine’s Arab majority and Jewish minority for control of the territory, the former eventually supported by troops from surrounding Arab states. Jewish forces won, and the State of Israel was created from 77 percent of Palestine. Jordan and Egypt took control of the remaining 23 percent. Jordan annexed the area under its control and called it the West Bank; Egypt maintained control over what became known as Gaza but never annexed it. Israel seized both areas during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and later annexed East Jerusalem while keeping the bulk of the West Bank and Gaza under occupation. Israel also drew international criticism by erecting more than 180 Jewish settlements in the areas.

As part of the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the two sides signed a series of agreements beginning in 1993 that provided for a limited withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of an autonomous, PLO-run government in areas inhabited by Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority (PA) began functioning in 1994.

The two sides deferred negotiations over “final status issues” to a later date. Among these issues were whether the Palestinian-governed regions of the West Bank and Gaza would become an independent state and what its borders would be. The result is that the autonomous Palestinian areas remain locked in an unviable, semi-statal condition. Following the staged Israeli withdrawal, the PA exercises full civil and security control over 80 percent of Gaza. The remainder contains Jewish settlements and is still under Israeli control.

The situation in the West Bank is much more complicated. The Israeli-Palestinian agreements created three zones: Area A consists of territory under the full civil and security control of the PA; Area B is territory under the PA’s civil and partial security control, but Israeli forces exercise predominant control; and Area C remains under full Israeli control and contains the Israeli settlements. By 2000, 17 percent of the West Bank was classified as Area A, 29 percent as Area B, and 59 percent as Area C. Much of the area where the PA exercises some type of control does not form a contiguous territory, however. Gaza is separated from the West Bank, while in the West Bank, Areas A and B are themselves divided among 227 separate areas (199 of which are smaller than 2 square kilometers) that are separated from one another by Israeli-controlled Area C. All but 40,000 West Bank Palestinians live in Areas A and B.

A Young and Growing Population

The population of the West Bank and Gaza is almost completely Palestinian Arab. The bulk of these are Sunni Muslims: 92 percent of West Bankers and 99 percent of Gazans, with the rest Christians. In addition to the Palestinian population, approximately 214,000 Jewish settlers live in the West Bank and Gaza, according to the Foundation for Middle East Peace in Washington, DC [Data are from 2002.]

* Palestinian population only.
Source: US Census Bureau.

The population of the West Bank and Gaza boasts several notable features. The population growth rate is among the highest in the world: 3.4 percent in the West Bank and 4.0 percent in Gaza, according to US Census Bureau estimates. A full 45 percent of the West Bank population are children under 15 years of age, compared with 50 percent in Gaza. Palestinian-controlled Gaza is also one of the most densely populated places on earth with some 4,091 people per square kilometer. Regionally, the Palestinians exhibit high levels of literacy. Among those 15 years and older, the rate is 92 percent for males and 80 percent for females, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. About 825,000 Gazans (78 percent of total) and their descendants are registered refugees from the 1948 war as are 583,000 West Bankers (30 percent of total). Not all refugees reside in refugee camps: 55 percent of Gaza refugees live in 8 refugee camps while only 27 percent of West Bank refugees live in 19 camps.

Life expectancy at birth is relatively high compared with Arab countries. But the territory faces several significant health concerns relating to underdevelopment, the legacy of occupation, and ongoing political turbulence and violence. The Palestinian uprising since October 2000 itself includes a major health problem. Between October 2000 and late February 2002, more than 1,000 Palestinians were killed and over 17,000 injured in clashes with Israelis. Israeli forces have reentered parts of Areas A and B, prevented movement among many Palestinian areas, and laid siege to Palestinian towns. The escalation in tensions between the two sides has resulted in reduced access to health and medical facilities for some Palestinians.

Some economic indicators actually declined during the early years of the peace process and have recently worsened. During 1992-1996, real per capita gross domestic product for Palestinians declined by over 36 percent, because of the combined effects of falling aggregate incomes and high population growth, according to Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture. The poverty rate in September 2000 stood at 21 percent. During the first three months of the uprising that began in October 2000, the situation worsened as the Palestinian economy contracted by 50 percent and unemployment rose to 40 percent. The Jordan Investment Trust estimates that the economy suffered a total of US$6.8 billion in losses during the first 12 months of the uprising.

Pollution is an environmental and health risk. Of particular concern is groundwater pollution by organic and inorganic contaminants that seep into the aquifers, especially in Gaza. These include untreated sewage (only 38 percent of households are connected to sewage systems), garbage and industrial waste, and fertilizers from agricultural runoff. The West Bank and Gaza also face problems from dumps, including Israeli dumps over which Palestinians have no control.

Michael R. Fischbach is an associate professor of history at Randolph-Macon College in Ashland, Virginia, where he specializes in modern Middle Eastern history.

References

• Palestine Economic Research Institute (MAS), Economic Monitor 5 (June 1999).
• Jordan Investment Trust, Weekly Review & Analysis 1, no. 19 (November 11, 2001).
• US Census Bureau, International Data Base, accessed online at www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html, through March 20, 2002.
• Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), accessed online at www.pcbs.org, on April 16, 2002.
• Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, accessed online at www.pal-chambers.com, on April 16, 2002.

Children and youth with special health care needs (CYSHCN) who receive family-centered care generally have better health outcomes, research shows. When health care providers engage and prioritize the needs of the family, CYSHCN enjoy better overall health; better access to coordinated, ongoing, comprehensive health care within a medical home; fewer emergency department visits; and fewer unmet health needs.

Yet in the United States, CYSHCN families from disadvantaged groups face barriers to receiving high-quality family-centered care, according to a new analysis of national survey data by Paul Morgan, now at the University at Albany, SUNY, and colleagues at Penn State University and SRI International.¹

The researchers assessed family-centered care by measuring the extent to which doctors or other health providers:

• Spent enough time with the child.
• Listened carefully.
• Showed sensitivity to the family’s values and customs.
• Provided the family with specific information they need concerning the child.
• Helped the family feel like a partner in the child’s care.

Data were from the 2016–2019 National Survey of Children’s Health (NSCH), which uses a five-question screener to identify CYSHCN.

The study focused on the quality of care received by CYSHCN families in visits to health professionals in the previous year and controlled for potentially confounding factors including children’s general health status and the severity of their impairments.

Socioeconomic Background Is Tied to the Quality of Family-Centered Care

Morgan and colleagues found that some CYSHCN families report greater barriers to receiving high-quality family-centered health care, including:

• Families without consistent health insurance coverage.
• Poor and lower-income families.
• Single-parent families.
• Families who usually receive care in a clinic or health center, emergency room, or other setting outside a doctor’s office.
• Families of children with autism spectrum disorders, anxiety, or depression.

By contrast, families of CYSHCN with asthma—the most commonly reported special health care need—were significantly more likely to receive family-centered care than families of CYSHCN without asthma.

The results did not show consistent racial/ethnic disparities across all the measures of family-centered care—a finding that surprised the researchers. However, families of Black and Hispanic CYSHCN reported that providers spent relatively less time with their children compared with families of white CYSHCN. Families of Hispanic CYSHCN also said that providers showed less sensitivity to their family’s culture and customs.

A Targeted Approach Could Help Improve Care

Evidence from the study suggests that socioeconomic factors, rather than race or ethnicity, are central drivers of disparities in family-centered care among CYSHCN in the United States. To address these disparities, policies and systems of care serving these young people and their families can adopt comprehensive, coordinated approaches to increase provider-family engagement, cultural responsiveness, and shared decision-making, the authors noted.

To help particularly vulnerable CYSHCN families, targeted actions should focus on care provided in emergency departments, community clinics/health centers, and other non-office settings, and on providers caring for children with autism spectrum disorders or internalizing disorders, the authors suggested.

This article was produced under a grant from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). The work of researchers from Penn State University was highlighted.

The current growth of the population ages 65 and older, driven by the large baby boom generation—those born between 1946 and 1964—is unprecedented in U.S. history.

This aging of the U.S. population has brought both challenges and opportunities to the economy, infrastructure, and institutions.

Demographic Shifts

The number of Americans ages 65 and older is projected to increase from 58 million in 2022 to 82 million by 2050 (a 47% increase), and the 65-and-older age group’s share of the total population is projected to rise from 17% to 23%.¹

The U.S population is older today than it has ever been. Between 1980 and 2022, the median age of the population increased from 30.0 to 38.9, but one-third (17) of states in the country had a median age above 40 in 2022, with Maine (44.8) and New Hampshire (43.3) at the top of the list.²

The older population is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. Between 2022 and 2050 the share of the older population that identifies as non-Hispanic white is projected to drop from 75% to 60%.³

The rising diversity among older Americans can’t match the rapidly changing racial/ethnic composition of those under age 18, creating a diversity gap between generations. In 2022, fewer than half of children ages 0 to 17 (49%) were non-Hispanic white.⁴ But research shows that there is fluidity in how people identify with racial/ethnic categories: Mixed-race Americans (particularly mixed Hispanic and white) increasingly see themselves as part of the white majority.⁵

Positive Developments

Education levels are increasing. Among people ages 65 and older in 1965, only 5% had completed four years of college or more. By 2023, this share had risen to 33%.⁶

Older adults are working longer. By 2022, 24% of men and about 15% of women ages 65 and older were in the labor force. These levels are projected to rise further by 2032, to 25% for men and 17% for women.⁷

The poverty rate for Americans ages 65 and older has dropped sharply during the past 50 years, from nearly 30% in 1966 to 10% today.⁸ The Census Bureau’s Supplemental Poverty Measure, which accounts for non-cash benefits, tax credits, and medical expenses, shows that 14% of older Americans lived in poverty in 2022.⁹

More older adults can meet their daily care needs. Older adults are functioning better on their own, and a shrinking share are living in nursing homes and assisted living settings than a decade ago. Home modifications and assistive devices such as walkers have helped older Americans maintain their independence.¹⁰

Challenges

Gains in life expectancy recently stalled. U.S. life expectancy at birth declined by 2.4 years between 2019 and 2021.¹¹ The drop in life expectancy was driven largely by the COVID-19 pandemic, but deaths from drug overdoses, heart disease, chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, and suicide also played a role.¹² Life expectancy rebounded slightly in 2022, to 77.5 years, but not enough to offset the decline during the pandemic.

Obesity prevalence among older Americans has increased at an alarming rate. In a single generation—between 1988-1994 and 2015-2018—the share of U.S. adults ages 65 and older with obesity nearly doubled, increasing from 22% to 40%.¹³

Wide economic disparities are found across different population subgroups. Among adults ages 65 and older, 17% and 18% of those identifying as Latino and African American, respectively, lived in poverty in 2022—more than twice the rate of those who identified as non-Hispanic white (8%).¹⁴

More older adults are divorced compared with previous generations. The share of divorced women ages 65 and older increased from 3% in 1980 to 15% in 2023, and for men from 4% to 12% during the same period.¹⁵

More older women are living alone. Over one-fourth (27%) of women ages 65 to 74 lived alone in 2023. This share jumped to 39% among women ages 75 to 84, and to 50% among women ages 85 and older.¹⁶

Older Americans face a caregiving gap, especially those with lower incomes and dementia.¹⁷ Demand for elder care is expected to increase sharply with a rise in the number of Americans living with Alzheimer’s disease, which could more than double by 2050 to 13 million, from 6 million today.¹⁸

Social Security and Medicare expenditures will increase from a combined 9.1% of gross domestic product in 2023 to 11.5% by 2035 because of the large share of older adults.¹⁹

Federal budget cuts and tax increases may be inevitable as more members of the large baby boom cohort reach retirement age and become eligible for entitlement programs. Policymakers can invest resources today to reduce poverty and improve the economic outlook for workers. These investments can increase young workers’ future productive capacity and help offset the costs of an aging population.

Europe is the oldest region in the world, with almost one in five people ages 65 and older . Many European countries are concerned about the implications of this aging population, including a growing demand for old-age support and a shrinking pool of working-age people to provide it. As the urgency of the care-work crunch becomes more apparent, new research funded by the National Institute on Aging reveals that women and people without children take on a disproportionate share of this unpaid care work across the continent.

Europeans can expect to spend over half of their lives after age 15 providing unpaid family care work, including taking care of children and older relatives. However, women in Europe spend six more years doing unpaid caregiving work than European men, according to a study by Ariane Ophir, now at the Center d’Estudis Demogràfics, and Jessica Polos, now at DePaul University. ¹

Ophir and Polos estimated care life expectancy, or the number of years after age 15 people can expect to spend providing informal care, by sex in 23 European countries. ²  Data on unpaid caregiving came from the European Social Survey , and life expectancy data came from the Human Mortality Database’s abridged period life tables.

FIGURE 1. Women in Europe Spend More Years Than Men Doing Unpaid Caregiving Work, but Patterns Differ Across Countries

Total care life expectancy at age 15 in years by sex, 2004/2005

Source: Ariane Ophir and Jessica Polos, “Care Life Expectancy: Gender and Unpaid Work in the Context of Population Aging,” Population Research and Policy Review 41, no. 1 (2022): 197-227.

In the examined countries, the average care life expectancy is 33 years for men and 39 years for women, they found. And while the duration of caregiving life among men differs across countries—from 17 years in Portugal to 50 years in Norway—there is much less variability among women, reflecting how women consistently take on the primary caregiving burden, the authors explained.

By breaking down caregiving years by level of care, the authors also found that women spend significantly more time providing care at a high level, meaning daily or several times a week. In most of the examined countries, more than half of women’s caregiving years are spent on high-level care, compared to less than half of men’s. Women’s care life expectancy includes five to 10 more years of high-level caregiving than men’s in most countries, they found.

A similar gender gap in caregiving exists in the United States, according to Denys Dukhovnov of the University of California-Berkeley, Joan Ryan of the University of Pennsylvania, and Emilio Zagheni of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.³ Compared to men who provide care, women spend 67% more time on average—around 50 minutes per day—providing unpaid care, their analysis found.

Using data from the American Time Use Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Dukhovnov, Ryan, and Zagheni also showed that women in the United States spend twice as much time as men caring for young children, and that women in middle age spend slightly more time than men caring for older adults.

Both studies suggest the importance of considering the gender gap in informal caregiving when designing programs to promote more equitable work and family policies.

When counting unpaid family caregiving, older women and men in Europe can expect to work similar number of years

While women today are in the workforce longer than previous generations, they still spend fewer years employed than men in most European countries. But gender gaps in how long people work shrink or are even reversed when both paid and unpaid work are counted, a separate study by Ophir found.⁴

Ophir examined paid and unpaid working life expectancy at age 50 by sex, or the years 50-year-old women and men are expected to spend in employment and informal caregiving, including caring for grandchildren and helping older adults with daily activities. The study used data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) from 17 countries across Europe.⁵

Women’s working life expectancy is longer than men’s by up to a year in all but four countries, but the components of this work are very different for men and women, the study found. The largest component for women is years spent exclusively in unpaid work, while for men it is years spent only in paid work. Women are also expected to spend more years than men simultaneously in paid and unpaid work in most countries, compounding their caregiving burden.

Most of the years women and men care for grandchildren occur after retirement, while some of the years they spend caring for older adults happen while still employed, especially for men, the study found. While women spend more years than men providing both types of care, the gap is larger with grandchild care, possibly reflecting women’s tendency to retire earlier, Ophir says.

Though concerns over the care burden in aging societies often focus on caring for older adults, caring for grandchildren is also an important part of working life among older women, Ophir says. Debates on increasing retirement age and work-family policies should therefore incorporate an intergenerational perspective, she suggests.

The gendered pattern of caregiving years suggests that women’s “additional investment in unpaid care work in older adulthood, which conflicts with paid work and does not count toward pension benefits, could exacerbate gender inequality later in life and expose older women to additional economic disadvantages,” Ophir further explains.

Childless adults in Europe are more likely to support their older parents than adults with children

Luca Maria Pesando, now at New York University, found that adults with no children are about 20% to 40% more likely than those with children to provide financial, practical, and emotional support to their older parents, especially to mothers.⁶ Using Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) data from 11 European countries, his study examined support to older parents among adults ages 40 and older and whether having any children made a difference.⁷

Assessing the support provided to mothers and fathers separately also reveals gendered patterns. Women are more likely than men to provide support to mothers, regardless of whether they have children, Pesando found. Compared to those with children, both childless men and women are more likely to provide support to their mothers. In contrast, while childless women are more likely to provide support to their fathers, childlessness does not relate to the likelihood that men will provide support to their fathers.

The difference may reflect mothers being more socially and emotionally connected to their children than fathers, Pesando explains. Fathers are also more likely than mothers to have spouses still alive to provide support —reducing the potential burden on adult children—but the study controlled for this gender difference.

These findings are important in light of the growing share of childless adults in most European countries and concerns over the impact on demand for public support as people age. “These findings… support the view that researchers and policymakers should take into more consideration not only what childless people receive or need in old age, but also what they provide as middle-aged adults,” Pesando says.

Patterns of informal caregiving vary across countries, reflecting demographic and social characteristics

While most countries in Europe older populations compared to the rest of the world, life expectancy and fertility levels vary. Norms around gender and family responsibilities also vary, partly reflecting differences in social policies that affect gender equality and care provision. All three studies conducted in Europe show variations in their findings across countries, in part due to their unique demographic profiles, norms, and policies.

Ophir and colleagues show that while the care life expectancy does not vary substantially across countries, the proportion of years spent providing high-level care differs. In Nordic countries such as Denmark and Sweden, women and men have longer care life expectancies but spend a smaller share of this time providing high-level care; they also have smaller gender gaps in caregiving. These countries have more egalitarian gender ideologies than other European countries and more generous welfare regimes that include family caregiving, the researchers say. They are also similar across some demographic factors, such as total fertility rate, age at first birth, life expectancy, and healthy life expectancy, they note.

In countries in Southern Europe, such as Greece, and some Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovakia, care life expectancies are shorter but involve greater shares of high-level caregiving. These countries rely more on families to take on primary caregiving responsibilities, the researchers note. They do not, however, share similar demographic profiles, suggesting the importance of social contexts in addition to demographic factors in shaping the nature of care life expectancy, they add.

In her analysis examining both unpaid and paid work, Ophir also finds variation across countries in the intensity of care. For example, while the overall working life expectancy is the longest for Swedish adults, most of their unpaid work was low intensity, reflecting the country’s generous welfare regime. While the overall working life expectancy is relatively shorter in Greece, Italy, and Poland, most of the unpaid work for women involves higher-level caregiving.

Pesando finds that adults are less likely to care for their older parents in Northern Europe, where comprehensive publicly funded programs can provide this care. Though differences are not large among countries in Eastern and Western Europe, adults are most likely to support older parents in Russia, followed by Czechia. Both countries are former socialist welfare states with heavy reliance on family support and limited publicly funded services for older adults, he notes.

Despite concerns over the economic implications of population aging and the labor force participation of older adults, informal caregiving has received little attention in policy debates. The disproportionate burden that falls on women and adults without children is therefore largely unnoticed. Discussions of aging-related policies, including pension reforms, old-age entitlements, and changes in the retirement age, should be informed by patterns in informal caregiving. Addressing informal caregiving also helps promote gender equality, especially in later life.

Having been on the forefront of Manifest Destiny, the Gold Rush, and post-World War II urban sprawl, the Southwest has had a long history of exponential growth, innovation, and development. But is this the case across the entire region?  

Here, we present a tale of two states—Arizona and New Mexico—and break down five reasons why the actual story is more nuanced than it seems. 

1. Their populations are not growing at the same rate. Compared to the nation as a whole, which grew by roughly 7% over the decade, New Mexico’s population growth was below average (3%), while Arizona’s was above average (12%). This difference is not explained by fertility rates in Arizona and New Mexico. Nor is it explained by mortality rates; despite New Mexico having a higher age-adjusted mortality rate than Arizona between 2010-2020, the difference is not impactful. It boils down to migration, especially of people moving from other, often neighboring, states. Heading into 2020, Arizona had a net migration gain of almost 600,000 new residents, while New Mexico had a net loss of about 40,000 people.

2. Metropolitan counties are booming, especially in Arizona. Growth in metropolitan counties drove population gains in Arizona and New Mexico from 2010 to 2020. And while most of the population in both states resides in metropolitan counties, the share is much higher in Arizona (Figure 1). This is partly due to the more urbanized landscape of the state: More than half of Arizona’s counties are classified as metropolitan, compared to less than 1 in 5 counties in New Mexico.  

Figure 1. 95% of Arizonans Live in Metropolitan Counties, Compared to 67% of New Mexico Residents

Percent of total state population, by county-type of residence

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171); USDA Economic Research Service, 2013 Urban Influence Codes.

In fact, more people live in Arizona’s metro counties than in the entire state of New Mexico. The two largest counties in Arizona are each home to over 1 million people, while the largest in New Mexico has under 700,000. While Bernalillo County is home to 1 in 3 New Mexico residents, Arizona’s Maricopa County has over six times as many people (Figure 2).  

Figure 2. Across Both States, the Highest Population Concentration is in and Around Maricopa County, Arizona

Population density by county for Arizona and New Mexico, 2020

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171).

Migration into Maricopa County and surrounding counties has driven much of Arizona’s population growth. Meanwhile, most New Mexico counties saw negative net migration; 70% of the metro counties that grew experienced negative net migration, meaning the slight growth that they witnessed can largely be attributed to their birth and mortality ratios. Where New Mexico did see migration gains, the increase was likely due in part to job growth in the oil industry, which may not be sustainable over time.  

Figure 3. Maricopa County Accounts for the Large Majority of Migration Growth in the Area, With Net Migration More Than 6 Times the Next Highest County

Net migration in Arizona and New Mexico, by county, 2010-2019

Source: PRB U.S. Indicators: Net Migration (2010-19).

3. Metropolitan Arizona has an abundance of business and employment opportunities. Arizona boasts one of the fastest-growing economies in the country. Over the past half-decade, the state has consistently witnessed job, income, and sales growth above the national average, with Maricopa County experiencing significant expansions in sectors such as health care, information, construction, and accommodation and food services. Home to Phoenix and its multitude of edge cities, the county was the most populous and fastest-growing in the state from 2010 to 2020, witnessing a 16% jump in its population. New business and job growth, particularly in the tech industry, have earned the area the nickname “Silicon Desert”, reflecting its status as a prosperous, pro-business environment supportive of start-ups with a healthy job market that promotes in-migration but without the high cost of living of California’s Silicon Valley.  

4. New Mexico’s rural settings and struggling economic and education sectors are pushing people to leave. While New Mexico and Arizona rank similarly on quality of life indicators comparing cost-of-living, labor, inequality, life expectancy, and education characteristics, New Mexico lags a bit behind, mostly due to shorter life expectancy and lower rates of college degree attainment. Concerns about the quality of the K-12 education system may contribute to some of New Mexico’s out-migration, as families with children may choose to relocate to neighboring states for better schools. New Mexico scored among the 10 lowest ranking states on measures of fourth and eight-grade math and reading proficiency for the entirety of the 2010 to 2020 period.  

Differences in the states’ economic approaches and opportunities may also help explain the slow growth in New Mexico. While Arizona has largely focused on growing private markets and promoting entrepreneurship, New Mexico has concentrated more resources on public spending. While Arizona regularly ranked among the top 10 states for total job growth, New Mexico frequently ranked among the bottom 10 from 2010-2020. Low job growth combined with a lack of urban settings that appeal to young adults has resulted in out-migration of working-age people to surrounding states such as Arizona, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Texas in search of city life and better job opportunities.  

5. The future for the states presents different challenges. While job growth and the entrepreneurial spirit in Arizona may have their appeal, the state’s population growth is perpetuating increasingly urgent concerns about water availability amidst extensive residential development. Despite the current megadrought depleting the Colorado River—the primary source of water Arizona and all the states surrounding it—development continues without slowing. And while municipalities within Arizona are turning to other sources of water, such as groundwater and reservoirs, to continue accommodating population growth, these alternatives come with their own political complications and are finite. As the population grows and the water supply dwindles, Arizona is walking the limits on growth.

Meanwhile the out-migration of working-age adults and declining population of people under the age of 18 means New Mexico’s population is aging, which raises concern for further economic and quality of life consequences. Providing accommodations for a growing older adult population (such as healthcare, caregiving services, and accessibility modifications) and coping with a shrinking workforce puts pressure on the state’s economy. But recent trends, such as the rise in remote work, could present the opportunity to retain younger workers.  

Early adulthood is often thought of as an exciting time, marked by increased independence and new opportunities. As they enter their 20s, young people are often encouraged to enjoy the so-called best years of their lives. Yet, this stage can also be fraught with increased uncertainty and responsibility. especially for those navigating the transitions of young adulthood in a global pandemic, a new PRB analysis shows.

PRB analyzed data from spring 2020 through fall 2022 using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey to understand the anxiety of young adults (which we defined as people ages 18 to 29) relative to older adults (ages 60 and older). We found that more than 40% of young adults reported symptoms of anxiety—such as feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge—more days than not during the coronavirus pandemic.

These findings may not come as a surprise, given the events of the past three years: a global pandemic, record job losses during COVID-19 shutdowns, an attack on the U.S. Capitol, widespread demonstrations and global attention addressing systemic racism and police brutality, and the steepest year-over-year increase in consumer prices in 40 years.

What is surprising is that amidst these events, and despite facing greater health risks from COVID-19, older adults maintained much lower levels of anxiety than young adults during the pandemic. In fact, the anxiety age gap grew even as vaccines became available, restrictions were lifted, and the impacts of the pandemic on health, education, social relationships, and employment began to subside (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Young Adults Were the Most Anxious Group Throughout the COVID-19 Pandemic

Anxiety rates by age group, early and late pandemic period

Note: Early pandemic covers the period from April 23, 2020, to March 29, 2021, and late pandemic covers the period from April 27, 2022, to October 17, 2022. The Early Pandemic period reflects the period before vaccines were broadly available for COVID-19 while the Late Pandemic period reflects the period beginning one year after vaccine access began.

Source: PRB analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey.

Here is what we know about the growing anxiety age gap during the COVID-19 pandemic:

1. Anxiety rates dropped more for older adults than young adults—though young adults faced lower health risks.

Compared with young adults, older adults are much more likely to experience serious health issues from COVID-19 infections, and adults ages 65 to 74 have a COVID-19 death rate that is 60 times higher than the rate for young adults. Yet, as the pandemic progressed, the share of older adults reporting anxiety fell by 6 percentage points (from 22% to 16%), while anxiety rates for young adults decreased by 2 percentage points (from 43% to 41%).

2. Young adults were more anxious than older adults before the pandemic.

Recent cohorts of young adults have reported more clinical mental health symptoms than previous generations during the same life stage, a trend that extends back to the 1930s. Ahead of the pandemic, young adult anxiety was already rising, while older adult anxiety was on the decline.

Researchers have provided several explanations for this anxiety gap. Young adults may have different emotional responses to stressors than older adults, and older adults may be more likely to have received treatment for anxiety, resulting in fewer symptoms, or less likely to report their symptoms. Additionally, among young adults, addictive use of social media and growing concern about climate change and its impact on their futures have been linked to increased depression, anxiety, and stress among young adults.

3. The anxiety age gap grew for all racial and ethnic groups during the pandemic, but especially for Black adults.

The anxiety gap between Black young adults and Black older adults increased by 9 percentage points between April 2020 and October 2022. Black adults ages 18 to 29 saw a significant increase in anxiety (+3 percentage points), those 60 and older saw anxiety drop significantly (-7 percentage points).¹

While the size of the gap grew most for Black adults, white non-Hispanic adults had the largest anxiety age gap overall at more than 25 percentage points. In fact, white young adults were significantly more anxious than their non-white peers, while white older adults were significantly less anxious than their non-white peers.

Figure 2. The Anxiety Age Gap Was Largest for White Adults, but Black Adults Saw the Gap Increase Most

Size of gap in anxiety rates by age group and racial/ethnic groups during the pandemic

Notes: Young adults refers to adults ages 18 to 29 while older adults refers to those ages 60 and older. Early pandemic covers the period from April 23, 2020, to March 29, 2021, and late pandemic covers the period from April 27, 2022, to October 17, 2022. The asterisk (*) in racial/ethnic categories denotes non-Hispanic.

Source: PRB analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey.

4. Economic uncertainty alone does not explain the growing anxiety age gap.

Prior to the pandemic, many young adults were already worried about accessing and paying for health care, housing and food security, student loans, and personal debt. Young adults also have lower incomes, on average, compared with older adults—most of whom receive Social Security benefits. And they were particularly impacted by economic upheaval during the pandemic, especially those working in hospitality, leisure, and retail.  

However, using the Household Pulse Survey, we found that the share of young adults living in lower-income households (making less than $25,000 a year) decreased during the pandemic, dropping from 26% to 19% (Figure 3). Meanwhile, the share of older adults living in low-income households increased slightly.

While this may be partially explained by more young adults living with parents during the pandemic, we found similar patterns for job and housing insecurity; young adults’ economic well-being improved relative to older adults over the period examined, yet their anxiety rates did not fall in proportion to these improvements.

Figure 3. The Share of Young Adults Living in Lower-Income Households Declined During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Percent of persons living in lower-income households by age group and period

Note: Lower-income refers to persons living in households with incomes below $25,000. Early pandemic covers the period from April 23, 2020, to March 29, 2021, and Late pandemic covers the period from April 27, 2022, to October 17, 2022.

Source: PRB analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey.

5. The pandemic uniquely affected areas of life young adults were already more worried about.

Because young adulthood is a period defined by personal, professional, and educational transitions, the pandemic’s impact on the economy, education systems, and opportunities for social interaction uniquely affected people in this age group. Pandemic conditions such as lockdowns, social distancing, shifts to virtual schooling, and restrictions on travel, intensified these areas of stress and worry that young adults were experiencing before the health crisis occurred.

Young adults were more likely to report that COVID-19 made it feel impossible for them to plan for their future, that their plans had been disrupted, and that their close relationships were negatively impacted. They were also more worried about issues unrelated to the pandemic that occurred during this period, including political elections, changes to abortion laws, rising suicide rates, and increased media reporting of sexual assault cases. Relative to older adults, more young adults report a desire to stay informed, but that following the news increased their stress and worry. While the relative health risks of the pandemic were lower for young adults, disruptions to the milestones associated with young adulthood made this age group particularly vulnerable to the mental health tolls of the pandemic. While recent media have emphasized the mental health crisis affecting teens, less has been reported about young adults’ psychological well-being.  More research is needed to determine the lasting impacts of pandemic disruptions on the mental health of those who entered and navigated the so-called best years of their lives during this period of global uncertainty.”

Note

¹ Statistically significant at <0.0001.